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HE SAID, SHE SAID, SHE SAID:
WHY PENNSYLVANIA SHOULD ADOPT
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413 AND 414
"[T]hey persist in surviving-not only to survive, but to testify. The victims
elect to become witnesses. '
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, a mother reported to police that her son's uncle, Howard
Nevison, had been molesting her seven-year-old son since 1993; the moles-
tation began when the boy was just three years old.2 Nevison had
threatened to kill the boy if he told anyone. 3 The uncle was a "popular"
cantor at a New York temple. 4 The defense attacked the boy's credibility,
questioning his memory.5 The prosecution sought to introduce, and the
trial court admitted, evidence that Nevison had molested two other family
members forty years earlier.6
In Commonwealth v. Nevison,7 the Pennsylvania Superior Court re-
versed the trial court's ruling and excluded the testimony from Nevison's
other victims. 8 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Common-
wealth's appeal. 9 Ultimately, the prosecution reached a plea agreement
with Nevison, dropping the charge of aggravated indecent assault.10
When Nevison accepted the deal, the victim's family said that it was
1. ELIE WIESEL, ONE GENERATION AFTER 38 (Lily Edelman & Elie Wiesel trans.,
1970).
2. See Keith Herbert, August Trial Set for Ex-Cantor Accused of Molesting Nephew,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 29, 2005, at Bi (stating that "alleged abuse occurred during
holidays and family gatherings when Nevison visited relatives in Lower Merion").
3. See John Grogan,' One Outrage Follows Another, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 25,
2006, at BI (describing Nevison as "very large and very intimidating").
4. See Keith Herbert, N.Y. Cantor Avoids Prison Term for Sexual Assaults on
Nephew, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 20, 2006, at B4 (noting that judge called Nevison "a
perfect citizen" before this accusation).
5. See Gaiutra Bahadur, Nevison's Lawyers Target Nephew's Credibility, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Sept. 5, 2002, at B2 (explaining defense theory that boy's memory was
unreliable due to head injuries and therapy).
6. See Herbert, supra note 2 (noting that trial court ruled evidence was admis-
sible to show "common scheme, plan or design").
7. 859 A.2d 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (unpublished table decision) (reversing
trial court's admission of other crimes evidence), affd, 863 A.2d 1145 (Pa. 2004)
(unpublished table decision) (affirming exclusion of other crimes evidence).
8. See id. (excluding other crimes evidence).
9. See Commonwealth v. Nevison, 863 A.2d 1145 (Pa. 2004) (unpublished ta-
ble decision) (affirming exclusion of other crimes evidence).
10. See Herbert, supra note 4 (noting that this was felony and most serious
charge). Under Pennsylvania law:
[A] person who engages in penetration, however slight, of the genitals or
anus of a complainant with a part of the person's body for any purpose
(641)
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"pleased that justice will be served ... and that the trauma of a trial can be
avoided for [the victim]."11 But was justice achieved? 12
It is impossible to know what would have happened if the courts had
allowed the other victims to testify about Nevison's attacks on them:
Would prosecutors still have made a deal or would they have gone to
trial? 13 After Nevison's lawyers reached a plea agreement with the prose-
cutor, Montgomery County Judge Paul W. Tressler sentenced Nevison to
probation. 1 4 The judge said that Nevison "posed little threat to the com-
other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures
commits aggravated indecent assault if.
(1) the person does so without the complainant's consent;
(2) the person does so by forcible compulsion;
(3) the person does so by threat of forcible compulsion that would pre-
vent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;
(4) the complainant is unconscious or the person knows that the com-
plainant is unaware that the penetration is occurring;
(5) the person has substantially impaired the complainant's power to ap-
praise or control his or her conduct by administering or employing, with-
out the knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means
for the purpose of preventing resistance;
(6) the complainant suffers from a mental disability which renders him
or her incapable of consent;
(7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age; or
(8) the complainant is less than 16 years of age and the person is four or
more years older than the complainant and the complainant and the per-
son are not married to each other.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3125(a) (West Supp. 2006) (defining aggravated inde-
cent assault). In his plea, Nevison did not admit his guilt for any crime, but did
admit that prosecutors would probably prevail at trial on misdemeanor charges.
See Herbert, supra note 4 (noting that Nevison entered "Alford plea" on charges of
indecent assault, simple assault, terroristic threats, corruption of minors and en-
dangering welfare of child, and that prosecutors dropped charge of aggravated
indecent assault).
11. Keith Herbert, An Uncle Admits Molesting His Nephew, PHILA. INQUIRER,
June 13, 2006, at B3 (noting that "victim's parents said they were 'pleased' that
Nevison admitted to 'unconscionable acts' committed against their son"); see also
Keith Herbert, How the Child-Abusing Cantor Avoided Time in Prison, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Sept. 27, 2006, at B5 (noting that victim wanted case to end).
12. See Grogan, supra note 3 (arguing that sentence was unjust given "repul-
sive, unforgivable crime"); Herbert, supra note 11 (quoting First Assistant District
Attorney Risa V. Fermo who stated plea agreement "didn't give a child molester a
pass, but it allows the 17-year-old man to get on with his life").
13. See Tamara Larsen, Sexual Violence Is Unique: Why Evidence of Other Crimes
Should Be Admissible in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases, 29 HAMLINE L. REv.
177, 208 (2006) (arguing that "admission of prior bad acts at trial is vital to a
prosecutor's decision to move forward"); Herbert, supra note 11 (noting thatjudge
believed ruling excluding other crimes evidence "made it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for the D.A. to prosecute the felony").
14. See Herbert, supra note 4 (adding that judge ordered Nevison to visit
prison "so that he understands what lies ahead should he violate probation"). The
term of probation was twelve years. See id. (noting that judge also ordered Nevison
not to have contact with children under age twelve).
[Vol. 52: p. 641
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munity."15 If Nevison had been convicted of the most serious charge, ag-
gravated indecent assault, he would have faced a more severe sentence
and would have been required to register as a sex offender for the rest of
his life. 16
Crimes like Nevison's are common. 17 In 2004, there were 209,880
victimizations of rape or sexual assault in the United States.1 8 In Penn-
sylvania alone, there were 3535 forcible rapes.1 9 Some statistics, especially
those based on the reports of law enforcement agencies, may underesti-
mate the number of sex crimes actually committed because victims are
reluctant to report these crimes.20
15. Id. (describing judge's statements at sentencing). Later, the judge ex-
plained that he did not sentence Nevison to jail because Nevison was "65, suf-
fer[ed] from diabetes, and had a 'spotless' record," and because psychiatrists had
found that Nevison was not a pedophile. See Herbert, supra note 11 (noting that
Nevison's sentence "was in the low end of the state's sentencing guidelines" and
that "standard-range sentence could have included up to six months in jail").
16. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3125(c) (1) (West Supp. 2006) (designating
indecent sexual assault as second degree felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103
(West 1998) (providing that court may sentence person convicted of second de-
gree felony to up to ten years); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9795.1(b) (West Supp.
2006) (listing crimes that subject person to lifetime registration requirement).
Even based on Nevison's plea, the judge could have sentenced Nevison to up to
nineteen years in jail. See Herbert, supra note 11 (noting that prosecutor acknowl-
edged judge might also sentence Nevison to probation).
17. For a further discussion of sex crimes statistics, see infra notes 18-20 and
accompanying text.
18. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2004 Statistical Tables, tbl.26 (2004),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus0402.pdf (noting that
there were 207,240 incidents of rape or sexual assault in United States in 2004).
An incident is "[a] specific criminal act involving one or more victims and offend-
ers." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2004 Statistical Tables, Methodology (2004),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus/cvus04mt.pdf (explain-
ing that "[f]or example, if two people are robbed at the same time and place, this
is classified as two robbery victimizations but only one robbery incident"). A vic-
timization is defined as "[a] crime as it affects one individual or household." Id.
(defining household as "[a] person or group of people meeting either of the fol-
lowing criteria: (1) people whose usual place of residence is the same housing
unit, even if they are temporarily absent; (2) people staying in a housing unit who
have no usual place of residence elsewhere"). "For personal crimes, the number
of victimizations is equal to the number of victims involved." Id. (defining per-
sonal crimes as "[r]ape, sexual assault, personal robbery, assault, purse snatching
and pocket picking"). The data in this report was collected from the National
Crime Victimization Survey. See id. (explaining methodology of survey).
19. See U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office ofJustice Programs, Bureau ofJustice Sta-
tistics, Reported Crime in Pennsylvania, available at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/data
online/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm (last revised Feb. 2,
2006) (providing statistics on violent crimes of murder and non-negligent man-
slaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault, as well as on property
crimes). Statistics are based on FBI crime reports. See id. (explaining that National
Archive of Criminal Justice Data prepares reports).
20. See Debra Todd, Sentencing of Adult Offenders in Cases Involving Sexual Abuse
of Children: Too Little, Too Late?, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 487, 502 (2004) (citing Press
2007]
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Sex crimes prosecutions are particularly difficult.2 1 One study found
that less than half of rape arrests lead to conviction, "making it 30 percent
more likely that a robber is convicted than a rapist. '2 2 Further, "[o]ver
half of all rape prosecutions result in either a dismissal or an acquittal,
almost double the number for murder and almost 30 percent higher than
for robbery." 23 Another study found that "90 percent of all child [sexual]
abuse cases do not go forward to prosecution due to the trauma on the
child victim and evidentiary/procedural factors." 24 Because of the low
rate of success, prosecutors may be reluctant to bring rape charges in the
first place, fearing that societal stereotypes about rape victims make their
cases "unwinnable."
25
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sixty Percent of Convicted Sex Offenders Are on Parole or
Probation: Rapes and Sexual Assaults Decline (Feb. 2, 1997), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs) (noting that "during 1994-95, only one-third of rape and
sexual assault victims said they reported the offense to a law enforcement agency");
see also Larsen, supra note 13, at 192-93 (citing Dean G. Kilpatrick, Christine N.
Edmunds & Anne Seymour, Rape in America: A Report to the Nation 1 (Nat'l Victim
Ctr., Crime Victims Research & Treatment Ctr. 1992)) (remarking that while
"[o]ne out of every eight U.S. women has been the victim of forcible rape in her
lifetime," only "sixteen percent reported the crime to police").
21. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., THE RE-
SPONSE TO RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE (Comm. Print 1993)
(noting that "[n]inety-eight percent of rape victims will never see their attacker
apprehended, convicted and incarcerated"); CASIA SPOHN & JULY HORNEY, RAPE
LAw REFORM: A GRASSROOTs REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 19 (1992) (citing studies
to show that "conviction [in rape cases] is unlikely"); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND
THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 6 (1999) ("In the usual robbery case ... the
victim's identification of the defendant alone results in conviction .... But rape is
different. With rape, the victim's truthfulness is almost always challenged .. ");
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 979, 1013 (1993) (arguing "rape is an extremely difficult crime to charge and
the easiest of all to defend").
22. Schafran, supra note 21, at 1013 (noting that rape conviction rate has not
increased over time); see also Richard T. Andrias, Rape Myths: A Persistent Problem in
Defining and Prosecuting Rape, in UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE JUDICIAL
RESPONSE TO STRANGER AND NONSTRANGER RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, Tab 2, 3
(Nat'lJudicial Educ. Program 1994) (stating "[m]yths about rape have a corrosive
effect on society's ability to prosecute and convict rapists"); Joseph J. Mittleman,
Book Review, Sexual Assault Trials by Paul Der~hannesian II, 31-FEB PROSECUTOR 24
(1997) (arguing "[s] exual assault trials can be the most troubling and difficult that
a prosecutor will ever face" due to problems including "[t]raumatized victims,
skeptical jurors and scant evidence"); Gov. Rendell Signs Bills to Protect Children, Aid
Victims of Sexual Assault, Toughen Penalties for Sex Offenders, U.S. STATE NEWS, Nov.
29, 2006 ("Rape cases are some of the most difficult cases to prosecute. .. ").
23. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., THE RESPONSE TO RAPE:
DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE (Comm. Print 1993) (finding gender
bias in court system harms female victims).
24. See id. (quoting Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice (1985): "When
the Victim is a Child") (discussing stereotypes that affect attitudes about sex
crimes).
25. See id. (explaining that prosecutors believe cases where victim knows ac-
cuser are particularly difficult to win because of issue of consent); TASLITZ, supra
note 21, at 7 (finding that "prosecutors often require corroboration before even
4
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In order to address the high number of sex crimes and assist in the
prosecution of these crimes, Congress enacted Federal Rules of Evidence
413 and 414 in 1994.26 These rules facilitate admission of the defendant's
past acts of sexual assault in sexual assault cases and past acts of child mo-
lestation in child molestation cases.
2 7
Federal Rules 413 and 414 were intended to be a model that states
could use in reforming their rules of evidence related to sex crimes.
28
Since the enactment of these federal rules, ten states have adopted ver-
sions of them; Pennsylvania is not one of these states.29 In addition, at
least nine states have common law exceptions that admit propensity evi-
dence in sex crimes cases.30 Pennsylvania has a "lustful disposition" excep-
bringing a case" because "they are reluctant to spend scarce resources on cases
where juries will not convict").
26. See FED. R. EvID. 413, 414 (providing standards for admissibility of other
crimes evidence in sex crimes cases); see also 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed.
Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (arguing that similar crimes evidence
shows "unusual disposition of the defendent [sic]" and is important in light of
attacks on victim's credibility); 140 CONG. REc. S10276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Dole) (stressing importance of "similar-offense evidence" to
prosecutors); 137 CONG. REc. S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (analysis of rules)
(explaining that rules allowing other crimes evidence are necessary to show defen-
dant's motivation and to show improbability of multiple people falsely accusing
defendant of committing same type of crime).
27. See FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (stating that "[iun a criminal case in which the
defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant"); FED. R. EVD.
414(a) (stating that "[i]n a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another
offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for
its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant").
28. See 137 CONG. REc. S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (analysis of rules) (ex-
pressing concern that states adopting rules of evidence based on Federal Rules
have made "no special allowance for admitting similar crimes evidence in sex of-
fense cases").
29. SeeJoyce R. Lombardi, Because Sex Crimes Are Different: Why Maryland Should
(Carefully) Adopt the Contested Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 that Permit Propen-
sity Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Other Sex Offenses, 34 U. BALT. L. REv. 103, 116
(2004) (listing Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado and Illinois as states that en-
acted rules in their entirety and listing Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri and
Texas as states that enacted rules only with respect to child molestation cases).
30. See id. at 116, 110-11 (listing Arkansas, Washington, D.C., Georgia, Indi-
ana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin as having
common law "other sex crime exceptions") (citing Mosley v. State, 929 S.W.2d 693,
695 (Ark. 1996)) (upholding admissibility of evidence that defendant had pleaded
guilty to raping his stepdaughter in trial where defendant was accused of raping
his daughter); Johnson v. United States, 610 A.2d 729, 730 (D.C. 1992) (affirming
admissibility of evidence of defendant's prior sexual abuse of three other teenaged
girls where defendant was charged with sexually assaulting two teenagers); Goins v.
State, 571 S.E.2d 195, 198 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding admissibility of evidence
regarding prior conviction for rape, sodomy and sexual abuse as relevant to show
defendant's "lustful disposition, his bent of mind toward molesting children under
the age of consent, and his course of conduct"); Kuchel v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1032,
5
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tion;31 however, it applies only to evidence of past crimes committed
against the same victim.
32
This Casenote argues that Pennsylvania should adopt Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414 and that doing so would be consistent with other
aspects of Pennsylvania law.3 3 Part II discusses the features that distin-
guish sex crimes from other crimes and the rationale behind the enact-
ment of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414.3 4 Part III addresses
potential concerns with Federal Rules 413 and 414.3 5 Part IV compares
1033 (Ind. 1986) (upholding admissibility of evidence of defendant's "prior devi-
ate conduct" because "evidence of former similar offenses is admissible in sex
crimes involving a 'depraved sexual instinct'"); State v. Stephens, 466 N.W.2d 781,
785-86 (Neb. 1991) (stating that "sexual crimes have consistently been classified as
offenses in which evidence of other similar sexual conduct has been recognized as
having independent relevancy"); State v. Reeder, 413 S.E.2d 580, 583 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1992) (upholding admission of evidence regarding defendant's prior sexual
assault on young girls); State v. Fears, 688 P.2d 88, 90 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
modus operandi evidence admissible to rebut defense of consent in "a case involving
forcible sexual acts"); State v. Parsons, 589 S.E.2d 226, 234 (W. Va. 2003) (allowing
other crimes evidence in child sexual assault cases as evidence of defendant's lust-
ful disposition); State v. Fishnick, 378 N.W.2d 272, 277-78 (Wis. 1985), affid, 378
N.W.2d 272 (Wis. 1985) (declining to revisit previous holding that "[a] 'greater
latitude of proof as to other like occurrences' is clearly evident in Wisconsin cases
dealing with sex crimes, particularly those involving incest and indecent liberties
with a minor child")).
31. See Commonwealth v. Wattley, 880 A.2d 682, 686-87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(holding that common law "lustful disposition" exception remained valid even
though it was not codified in Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence), appeal granted, 901
A.2d 498 (Pa. 2006). One justice dissented, arguing that by deciding not to adopt
Federal Rules 413 and 414, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had rejected the lust-
ful disposition exception. See id. at 689 (McEwen, J., dissenting) (stating that he is
"of the view that under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, the evidence of appel-
lant's conviction in anotherjurisdiction, for acts which occurred subsequent to the
offenses at issue in this trial, was inadmissible under the facts of this case").
32. See Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 838-39 (Pa. 1992) (holding
that testimony that defendant had watched victim showering and fondled her
breasts prior to charged offense was admissible "[t]o show a passion or propensity
for illicit sexual relations with the particular person concerned in the crime on
trial") (quoting MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 449 (2d ed. 1972)); Wattley, 880
A.2d at 686-88 (allowing evidence of defendant's conviction for sexually abusing
his daughter in case where he was charged with similar crime); Commonwealth v.
Knowles, 637 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (stating that "[e]vidence of prior
sexual relations between defendant and his or her victim is admissible to show a
passion or propensity for illicit sexual relations with the victim").
33. For a further discussion of why Pennsylvania should adopt Rules 413 and
414, see infra notes 38-75 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of con-
sistency of Rules 413 and 414 with Pennsylvania law, see infra notes 175-97 and
accompanying text.
34. For a further discussion of the distinguishing factors of sex crimes and the
rationale behind enacting Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, see infra notes
38-75 and accompanying text.
35. For a further discussion of potential concerns with implementing Federal
Rules 413 and 414, see infra notes 76-138 and accompanying text.
646 [Vol. 52: p. 641
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the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence to trends in Pennsylvania case law. 36
Part V explores how several recently enacted Pennsylvania statutes, unlike
the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, reflect an acknowledgement that sex
crimes should be treated differently than other crimes.
3 7
II. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF SEX CRIMES JUSTIFY ADOPTING FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 413 AND 414
A. Characteristics of Sex Crimes Lead to
Focus on the Victim's Credibility
Sex crimes are different from other types of crimes. 38 Most notably,
sex crimes often lack witnesses because perpetrators choose to attack their
victims in secluded locations. 39 Furthermore, physical evidence is often
lacking in sex crimes cases.40 This lack of physical evidence may be due to
the victim's inability to physically resist his or her attacker. 4 1 When the
victim does not resist, there are frequently no visible physical injuries.4 2
36. For a further discussion of the tension between the Pennsylvania Rules of
Evidence and trends in Pennsylvania case law, see infra notes 139-74 and accompa-
nying text.
37. For a further discussion of how recently enacted Pennsylvania statutes rec-
ognize uniqueness of sex crimes, see infra notes 175-97 and accompanying text.
38. See Larsen, supra note 13, at 192-202 (arguing for change in Minnesota
Rules of Evidence based on unique characteristics of sex crimes including delays in
reporting, lack of physical evidence, societal views about sex crimes and reluctance
to believe women and children); Lombardi, supra note 29, at 117 (stating that lack
of witnesses and physical evidence distinguish sex crimes from other crimes);
Todd, supra note 20, at 489-90 (arguing that sexual abuse of children is character-
ized by lack of physical injuries sustained by victims, "conspiracy of silence" among
adults who fail to protect children and high recidivism rates among molesters).
39. See Lombardi, supra note 29, at 117 (noting that sex crimes "often take
place in secret, leaving no witnesses"); Todd, supra note 20, at 502 (citing Press
Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Sixty Percent of Convicted Sex Offenders Are on Parole or
Probation: Rapes and Sexual Assaults Decline (Feb. 2, 1997), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs) (noting that Department of Justice reported that "almost
60% of the rapes and sexual assaults took place in the victim's home or at the
home of a friend, relative or neighbor, as reported by victims in the Bureau of
Justice Statistics Survey").
40. See Larsen, supra note 13, at 197 (explaining that lack of physical evidence
places additional emphasis on credibility); Lombardi, supra note 29, at 117 (noting
lack of "current physical evidence" due to delays in reporting); Todd, supra note
20, at 497 (noting that sexually abused children "may exhibit no physical signs of
harm").
41. See Larsen, supra note 13, at 197 (explaining that victims may not physi-
cally resist due to "fear of being further harmed or due to emotional trauma").
Further, child victims are less likely to physically resist than adult victims. See id.
(explaining that children's inability to resist and elastic nature of their skin con-
tribute to lack of physical injuries).
42. See Lynne Hecht Schafran, Barriers to Credibility: Understanding and Coun-
tering Rape Myths, in UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO
STRANGER AND NONSTRANGER RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, Tab 2, 9 (Nat'l Judicial
Educ. Program 1994) (stating "[p]hysical injuries apart from the rape itself are
rare and sexual assault leaves no visible physical 'evidence' different from consen-
2007]
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Sexual assault victims often do not report the crime immediately.43
Adult victims hesitate to report the crime due to feelings of shame or fear
that no one will believe them, or because they blame themselves for what
happened. 44 Child victims may not report sexual crimes immediately be-
cause they do not understand the significance of the sexual act or they
fear that adults will not believe them.4 5 A delay in reporting may result in
the disappearance of physical evidence.
46
Lack of physical evidence and witnesses makes the credibility of the
victim and the accused the focus of the case. 4 7 Some people are reluctant
to believe that a rape occurred when there is no physical evidence that
sual sexual activities"); TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 6 (arguing that "we demand cor-
roboration in the form of physical evidence of force," but that "the majority of
rape cases leave no wounds, not even bruises or scratches"); Larsen, supra note 13,
at 197 (noting that "police often expect to find serious, visible injuries as proof to
corroborate the rape").
43. See Schafran, supra note 42, at 11 (noting that according to one study, of
sixteen percent of women who report rape at all, approximately one-quarter re-
port within twenty-four hours); Larsen, supra note 13, at 193 (arguing that delay in
reporting damages victim's credibility).
44. See Schafran, supra note 42, at 12-15 (listing reasons for failure to report
rape: "Not knowing the assault was legally rape; [d]enial and suppression;
[p]sychogenic amnesia, [flear of retaliation; [f]ear of being disbelieved and
blamed; [f]ear of loss of privacy; [f] ear of the criminal justice system"); see also
TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 6 (stating "many women are so shocked, ashamed, and
fearful that they long delay reporting the crime"); Larsen, supra note 13, at 194
(explaining that "self-blame is magnified in circumstances where, for example, the
victim was drinking or invited the rapist into her home").
45. SeeJOHN E. B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PRACTICE
137 (2d ed. 1998) ("Some abused children are threatened into silence. Others are
too embarrassed to tell. Some abused children suffer psychological trauma that
interferes with disclosure.") (internal citations omitted); Larsen, supra note 13, at
196 (noting that adults frequently do not believe children who report sexual
abuse); Todd, supra note 20, at 489 (referring to "conspiracy of silence among
adults in the home who look the other way or refuse to believe or protect the
child").
46. SeeJames Wilson Harshaw III, Comment, Not Enough Time?: The Constitu-
tionality of Short Statutes of Limitations for Civil Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 753, 764 (1989) (noting that physical evidence in child molestation cases
"disappears quickly"); see also Larsen, supra note 13, at 197 (explaining that evi-
dence disappears when victims wash their bodies and clothes, evidence of date
rape drugs disappears over time, and evidence in general may become tainted over
time); David P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
439, 490 (2001) (noting that "physical evidence ... often has been destroyed by
the time the [sexual] crime is reported and investigated").
47. See TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 6 ("With rape, the victim's truthfulness is
almost always challenged: she is covering a pregnancy, hiding an affair, seeking
revenge for advances spurned. Or the problem is her character: a slut, drug ad-
dict, 'nut' case, or congenital liar. Consequently, we demand corroboration. ...
Yet, the majority of rape cases leave no wounds. . . ."); Larsen, supra note 13, at 193
("It is not uncommon for victims of rape and child molestation to delay reporting
the crime to authorities; thus, reducing their credibility."); Lombardi, supra note
29, at 117 (stating "sex offense cases often result in a credibility contest between
two parties, between whom there is usually a great disparity of power").
648 [Vol. 52: p. 641
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indicates that the victim resisted.48 Delays in reporting may cause the jury
to question the credibility of the victim, a problem which, in some states, is
magnified by jury instructions. 49 Victims are often at a disadvantage be-
cause many people do not want to believe accusations of rape and child
molestation. 50 Furthermore, society has historically viewed women and
children, who comprise the majority of sexual assault and child molesta-
tion victims, as less credible than men.
5 1
48. See Schafran, supra note 42, at 9-10 (arguing "[m]any judges and juries
want evidence of physical damage, which they perceive as proof of the victim's lack
of consent"); see also TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 7 (noting that while law no longer
requires corroboration, 'juries demand corroboration"); MichelleJ. Anderson, Re-
viving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 953, 991 (1998) (arguing that
women should resist attackers in order to prevent rape, create evidence of lack of
consent and reduce their own psychological trauma).
49. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., THE RESPONSE TO
RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE 2 (Comm. Print 1993) (quoting
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AcT OF
1991, S. REP. No. 197, at 42-46 (1st Sess. 1991)) (noting "women assaulted by sex-
ual means are routinely subject to legal hurdles other victims will never face"); see
also PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4.13A(3)
(2005) (stating that jury "must not consider [name of victim]'s [failure to make]
[delay in making] a complaint as conclusive evidence that the act did not occur or
that it did occur but with [his] [her] consent"); PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STAN-
DARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4.13A(2):
The evidence of [name of victim]'s [failure to complain] [delay in mak-
ing a complaint] does not necessarily make [his] [her] testimony unrelia-
ble, but may remove from it the assurance of reliability accompanying the
prompt complaint or outcry that the victim of a crime such as this would
ordinarily be expected to make. Therefore, the [failure to complain] [de-
lay in making a complaint] should be considered in evaluating [his]
[her] testimony and in deciding whether the act occurred [at all] [with
or without [his] [her] consent].
Id.; PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4.13A(3)
(stating that "[name of victim] 's failure to complain [at all] [promptly] [and the
nature of any explanation for that failure] are factors bearing on the believability
of [his] [her] testimony and must be considered by you in light of all the evidence
in the case"). Instruction 4.13 "is not appropriate where a child or a person other-
wise incapable, by mental infirmity, of promptly reporting the incident is the al-
leged victim." PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
4.13A, advisory committee's note (clarifying application of 4.13A).
50. See Schafran, supra note 42, at 34 (explaining that women subconsciously
think: "'[I]f I can distance myself from you-if I can tell myself that I would never
go to a bar or a man's apartment or accept a ride from someone I only knew
slightly, then I don't have to acknowledge my own vulnerability'"); Larsen, supra
note 13, at 198 (explaining that women in particular do not want to believe that
such horrible crimes are possible); Julie A. Wright, Using the Female Perspective in
Prosecuting Rape Cases, 29-FEB PROSECUTOR 19 (1995) (arguing female jurors feel
need to "reassure themselves that they are safe by distinguishing themselves from
the victim and blaming the victim for what has happened to her").
51. See Larsen, supra note 13, at 199 (quoting Christie Floyd, Admissibility of
Prior Acts Evidence in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases in Kentucky: A Proposed
Solution that Recognizes Cultural Context, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 133, 150 (1991)) (noting
"females comprise 93% of sexual assault victims and 77% of child molestation vic-
tims" and arguing that "[w] omen's accusations were often attributed to a desire for
,money, marriage, or to attain personal revenge, unconscious wishes for the sexual
2007]
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In addition, jurors may doubt the credibility of the victim if the cir-
cumstances of the case do not match their preconceived notions of what a
rapist and a rape victim should look like.5 2 In particular, people are reluc-
tant to believe a victim who was under the influence of alcohol or drugs
during the rape, had a prior relationship with the attacker, had filed a
rape complaint before or was mentally disabled. 53 Knowing that people
hesitate to believe certain vulnerable individuals, some rapists seek out vic-
tims who they think will appear uncredible.
5 4
In addition to the other problems relating to credibility determina-
tions, victims of sex crimes also face the unique challenge of convincing a
jury that they did not consent to the sexual act. 55 In the words of one rape
victim:
experience, and masochistic tendencies"'). The Kobe Bryant and Michael Jackson
cases provide evidence that people still make assumptions about women and chil-
dren who accuse a rich person of sexual assault or molestation. See id. at 199-200
(stating "[m]edia reports of both allegations commonly included accusations that
the victims were only seeking to get money from the celebrities"); see also STAFF OF
S. COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 103D CONG., THE RESPONSE TO RAPE: DETOURS ON THE
ROAD TO EQUALJUSTICE 27 (Comm. Print 1993) (stating female rape victims face
prejudice when "police officers refuse to take a report; prosecutors encourage de-
fendants to plead to minor offenses; judges rule against victims in evidentiary mat-
ters; and juries, despite instructions to the contrary, continue to lay the blame on
the survivor").
52. See Schafran, supra note 42, at 1-2 (arguing that in "stereotyped narrative
about 'real rape' . . . rape is an infrequent crime in which a degenerate, sex-
starved, knife-wielding stranger jumps from the bushes to attack a blameless, nu-
bile young woman"); see also TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 8, 15-43 ("Whom jurors
believe turns on the consistency of each witness's testimony with the plausible sto-
ries that juries create based upon their preexisting stock."); Larsen, supra note 13,
at 200-01 n.145 (noting that "mythical" rape victim is "timid, beautiful, and most
likely crying or otherwise visibly upset" and mythical rapist is "African American,
Hispanic, poor, or uses poor grammar").
53. See Larsen, supra note 13, at 195 (noting people fail to focus on fact that
these characteristics also increase victim's vulnerability); see also TASLITZ, supra note
21, at 28 (noting media "focus on stranger rapes" makes people skeptical about
acquaintance rape); id. at 39 (noting "arguments that the woman . .. consumed
alcohol decrease the likelihood that people will that find there was a rape"); Scha-
fran, supra note 42, at 30-31 (arguing "[w]omen who drink to excess are held re-
sponsible for the men's behavior as well as their own").
54. See Bonnie Brandl and Julie Rozwadowski, Responding to Domestic Abuse in
Later Life, 5 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 108, 117 (2003) ("Often abusers look for vic-
tims who are not competent or not considered 'good reporters' because they see
them as easy prey."); David P. Bryden and Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal
Justice System, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1358 (1997) (noting that "a study
of gang rape found that the rapists usually select victims known to have a 'bad
reputation'"); Larsen, supra note 13, at 195 (indicating convicted rapists have said
some rapists intentionally choose victims with credibility problems).
55. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari):
Alleged consent by the victim is rarely an issue in prosecutions for other
violent crimes-the accused mugger does not claim that the victim freely
handed over this wallet as a gift-but the defendant in a rape case often
[Vol. 52: p. 641
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Rape is the only felony that places the onus on the survivor. If an
assailant held you at knifepoint, asked you for your wallet, and
you complied, there is no question that a crime was committed.
You would not be asked if you had consented. You would not be
asked if you had tried to resist. Only survivors of rape are asked
these questions.
56
Furthermore, rape victims also face questions about their prior sexual
history, while victims of other crimes do not have to answer questions
about their past.57 Although rape shield laws limit the admission of evi-
dence about the victim's sexual history, they do not completely protect the
victim from inquiries into the victim's sexual past.5 8 Consequently, the
contends that the victim engaged in consensual sex and then falsely ac-
cused him.
Id.; Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1203, 1204
(1998) ("It is the issue of consent, whether by virtue of capacity to consent or
because there is coercion, that defines rape and child molestation as crimes.");
Larsen, supra note 13, at 193 (noting reluctance of victims to report rape).
56. Larsen, supra note 13, at 193 (quoting Sharon Hunter, Gail Bums-Smith
& Carol Walsh, Equal Justice? Not Yet for Victims of Sexual Assault, 2000, available at
http://www.connsacs.org/library/justice.html) (noting that sixteen percent of
rape victims reported crime to police).
57. See STAF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., THE RESPONSE TO
RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE 6 (Comm. Print 1993) ("We must
demand to know why prior sexual history is relevant in a rape case, when prior
financial history is irrelevant in a robbery case."); Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do
Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine,
46 VILL. L. REv. 907, 936 (2001):
Women know what has happened to rape victims in the past and what
often continues to happen today: embarrassing questions by the police
and prosecutors in private and by defense attorneys in public about a
victim's sexual history, the implicit argument that the woman assumed
the risk of sexual violence by looking or acting 'provocatively' and the
focus on the woman's failure to employ sufficient resistance against the
man she now claims attacked her.
Id.; Megan Reidy, The Impact of Media Coverage on Rape Shield Laws in High-Profile
Cases: Is the Victim Receiving a "Fair Trial"?, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 297, 298 (2005)
(arguing that "rape is unlike any other crime; it is the only crime in which the
criminal justice system treats victims as defendants"); Anne W. Robinson, Eviden-
tiaiy Privileges and the Exclusionary Rule: Dual Justifications for an Absolute Rape Victim
Counselor Privilege, 31 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 331, 331-33 (dis-
cussing defense attorneys' use of counseling records to discredit victims).
58. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sex-
ual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 55 (2002) (argu-
ing exceptions in rape shield laws "routinely gut the protection they purport to
offer"). For example, the federal shield and state shields allow evidence of the
victim's sexual history when it is offered to show consent and when it involves sex
with the defendant. See id. at 56 (arguing this exception "cracks the shield because
men with whom the complainant has been previously intimate commit 26% of all
rapes"). An exception in some shield laws that allows evidence of the victim's sex-
ual history when "its exclusion would violate defendant's constitutional rights," is
problematic because courts "routinely misinterpret and exaggerate the scope of
the defendant's constitutional right to inquire into the complainant's sexual his-
tory, particularly when the complainant is deemed promiscuous with the defen-
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defense's introduction of this evidence makes it more difficult for victims
to convince the jury that they did not consent to the sexual act.59
Finally, the increasing emphasis placed on DNA evidence often
means that a lack of DNA evidence calls into question the victim's credibil-
ity. 60 This response to lack of DNA evidence ignores the possibility that
DNA evidence is missing because the rapist used a condom or the evi-
dence disappeared before the victim reported the crime. 6 1 Because peo-
ple have come to expect DNA evidence, a lack of such evidence
undermines the victim's credibility.
6 2
B. Recidivism Among Sex Offenders
Another distinguishing factor of sex crimes is the high recidivism
rates among sex offenders.6 3 According to a 2003 Department of Justice
report, sex offenders were rearrested for new sex crimes within three years
dant or others." Id. (arguing this exception "often crumbles what is left of the
shield").
The Pennsylvania rape shield law allows "evidence of the alleged victim's past
sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at issue
and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence." 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104(a) (West 2000) (limiting admission of victim's sexual
history).
59. See Michelle J. Anderson, Time to Reform Rape Shield Laws: Kobe Bryant Case
Highlights Holes in the Armor, 19-SUM CRIM. JUST. 14, 14-15 (noting jurors doubt
testimony of "promiscuous" complainants).
60. See Larsen, supra note 13, at 197 (arguing investigators may "be skeptical
about the victim's story" if it is not corroborated by DNA evidence); see also An-
drew P. Thomas, The CSI Effect and Its Real-Life Impact on Justice: A Study By the Mari-
copa County Attorney's Office, 39-OCT PROSECUTOR 10 (2005) (noting television
programs mislead people about availability of scientific evidence).
61. SeeJohn Juhala, False Exclusions?, 37JuRIMETRICSJ. 325, 325 ("There are
many reasons why the DNA [on the victim] may not match [the DNA of the defen-
dant], such as use of condoms, failure to ejaculate, premature ejaculation, multi-
ple assailants, and improper samples."); see also Mark Hansen, The Great Detective,
87-APR A.B.A.J. 37, 40 (2001) (noting that some criminals "have donned condoms
and gloves, forced rape victims to shower or bathe, and even planted DNA evi-
dence from somebody else at the scene of their own crimes"); Larsen, supra note
13, at 197 (explaining that DNA evidence disappears "even when the assault is
reported within twenty-four to forty-eight hours as the victims may have showered
or washed their clothes in an effort to feel clean after the trauma of rape").
62. See Larsen, supra note 13, 197 (noting that many rapists are careful not to
leave DNA evidence).
63. See Madelyn J. Daley, Do Sexually Violent Predators Deserve Constitutional Pro-
tections?: An Analysis in Light of the Supreme Court's Ruling in Kansas v. Hendrick, 521
U.S. 346 (1997), 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 715, 733-34 (arguing that "many, some would say
a majority, of [repeat sexual offenders] . . . will not and cannot be cured");
Bridgette M. Palmer, Death as a Proportionate Penalty for the Rape of a Child: Consider-
ing One State's Current Law, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 843, 866 (1999) (noting that "the
average pedophile 'commits 282 illegal acts with 150 different victims'"); Todd,
supra note 20, at 490 (pointing out that child sexual abuse, "unlike many other
types of criminal behavior carries with it alarming statistics regarding recidivism").
652
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of release at a rate four times greater than other released convicts. 64 De-
partment ofJustice data concluded that "[r]eleased rapists were 10.5 times
as likely as non-rapists to be arrested for rape" and that people convicted
of sexual assault were "7.5 times as likely as those convicted of other crimes
to be arrested for a new sexual assault."6 5 Furthermore, these statistics
may even underestimate recidivism rates among sex offenders because of
the underreporting problem. 66 One study found that "[i] ncarcerated rap-
ists have usually raped two or three times before being apprehended."67
In addition, "[a]n interview with 377 men who were guaranteed confiden-
tiality and immunity from prosecution revealed each having engaged in
sexual activity with an average of 19.8 young girls and 150.2 young boys
within their lifetimes.
68
C. Addressing Unique Characteristics of Sex Crimes Through Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414
In order to address the problems created by the unique characteris-
tics of sex crimes, Congress enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and
414.69 The section-by-section analysis of the rules stated that "[t]he will-
ingness of the courts to admit similar crimes evidence in prosecutions for
serious sex crimes is of great importance to effective prosecution in this
area, and hence to the public's security against dangerous sex offend-
64. See Lombardi, supra note 29, at 118-19 (arguing that "[s]ex offenders are
unique: other criminals usually do not commit sex offenses").
65. Todd, supra note 20, at 513 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
supra note 19) (noting sex offenders "are substantially more likely than other vio-
lent offenders to be rearrested for a new violent sex offense"). The Justice Depart-
ment also found, however, that sex offenders are not greater recidivists than other
criminals. See id. (finding sex offenders "have a generally lower rate of re-arrest
than other violent offenders").
66. See Lombardi, supra note 29, at 120 (noting that "studies consistently show
that many convicted child molesters each have committed numerous, even hun-
dreds, of sex offenses that are never reported"); Recent Legislation: Criminal Law-
Sex Offender Notification Statute-Washington State Community Prevention Act
Serves as Model for Other Initiatives by Lawmakers and Communities-1990
Wash. Laws Ch. 3, §§ 101-1406 (Codified as Amended in Scattered Sections of
Wash. Rev. Code), 108 HA.v. L. REv. 787, 790 (noting that "sex offenses are dra-
matically underreported crimes"); Sherry L. Scott, Comment, Fairness to the Victim:
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Tri-
als, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1729, 1741 (1999) ("Sex crimes are highly underreported.").
67. Scott, supra note 66, at 1740 (concluding that "sexual offenses involve
highly repetitive behavior").
68. Id. (asserting that some child molesters "are habitual offenders, basically
incurable, and should be incarcerated for life").
69. See FED. R. EVID. 413, 414 (explaining admissibility of evidence of other
similar crimes in sexual assault and child molestation cases). For the relevant text
of these rules, see supra note 27. At the same time, Congress also enacted Rule 415
that pertains to civil suits involving sexual assault or child molestation. See FED. R.
EVID. 415 (allowing, in civil cases based on sexual assault or child molestation,
evidence of defendant's "commission of another offense or offenses of sexual as-
sault or child molestation").
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ers." 70 This report indicated that other crimes evidence is necessary to
help the jury assess the credibility of the victim. 7 1 Representative Susan
Molinari, the Principal House Sponsor of the bill, recognized that rules
413 and 414 were necessary to help establish the credibility of the victim,
especially when consent was at issue. 7 2 Further, the analysis of the bill
stated that evidence of prior sex crimes is an indication "that the defen-
dant had the motivation or disposition to commit sexual assaults, and lack
of inhibitions against acting on such impulses."
73
Like Congress, the Pennsylvania legislature has recognized that sex
offenders pose a particular danger of recidivism, and are likely to re-of-
fend even after having been convicted. 4 The Pennsylvania legislature,
however, does not have the power to adopt new rules of evidence that are
in tension with the rules created by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.7 5
70. 137 CONG. REC. S3238-39 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (noting "the approach
of the courts [regarding admission of other crimes in sex crimes cases] has been
characterized by considerable uncertainty and inconsistency").
71. See id. (noting need for other crimes evidence particularly in child moles-
tation cases, where defense attacks credibility of child victims).
72. See 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari) (arguing centrality of credibility is distinguishing characteristic in sex
crimes cases). Representative Molinari said:
Alleged consent by the victim is rarely an issue in prosecutions for other
violent crimes-the accused mugger does not claim that the victim freely
handed over [his] wallet as a gift-but the defendant in a rape case often
contends that the victim engaged in consensual sex and then falsely ac-
cused him.
Id. (arguing that "[k]nowledge that the defendant has committed rapes on other
occasions is frequently critical in assessing the relative plausibility of these claims
and accurately deciding cases that would otherwise become unresolvable swearing
matches"). Senator Dole also stressed the importance of evidence of other sex
crimes in aiding the jury in assessing the credibility of the complainant. See 140
CONG. REc. S10276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (arguing that in child molestation
cases "it is crucial that all relevant evidence that may shed some light on the credi-
bility of the charge be admitted at trial").
73. 137 CONG. REc. S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (noting that other crimes
evidence "could be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is rele-
vant"). In cases of child molestation, evidence of the defendant having previously
molested other children is "exceptionally probative because it shows an unusual
disposition of the defendant-a sexual or sadosexual interest in children-that
simply does not exist in ordinary people." 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug.
20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (arguing Rules 413 and 414 were "critical
to the protection of the public from rapists and child molesters").
74. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9791 (West Supp. 2006) (finding that "sexu-
ally violent predators pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses even after
being released from incarceration or commitments").
75. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c) ("The Supreme Court shall have the power
to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all
courts.... All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with
rules prescribed under these provisions.").
[Vol. 52: p. 641654
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/7
1II. ADDRESSING CRITICISMS OF RULES 413 AND 414
Critics of Federal Rules 413 and 414 argue that these rules unfairly
use other crimes evidence to prove the bad character of the defendant. 76
Second, opponents charge that the rules admit evidence that is prejudicial
to the defendant. 77 Third, critics have expressed concerns about the ad-
mission of evidence regarding uncharged acts and acts that occurred
many years prior to the charged offense. 78 Fourth, some argue that rape
shield laws that exclude evidence of the victim's sexual past mandate simi-
lar treatment of the defendant's sexual past. 79 Finally, critics have argued
that Rules 413 and 414 are unconstitutional.8"
76. See 140 CONG. REC. S10276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Biden) (arguing Rules 413 and 414 would allow prosecutor to admit other crimes
evidence to show defendant "is a bad guy").
77. See id. (arguing that Rules 413 and 414 would "allow total, uncorrobo-
rated, unsubstantiated testimony about something that could have happened-
anything-from the day before to 50 years before into a trial"); R. Wade King,
Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: By Answering the Public's Call for
Increased Protection from Sexual Predators, Did Congress Move Too Far Toward Encourag-
ing Conviction Based on Character Rather Than Guilt?, 33 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1167,
1190 (2002) (arguing "[e]vidence that the defendant has committed similar acts of
sexual misconduct... serves only to demonstrate the defendant's bad character or
propensity to commit such acts" and provides no proof that "defendant committed
the charged act").
78. See 140 CONG. REc. S10277 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Biden) (giving example that under new rules, witness can testify that 47-year-old
defendant tried to force her to have sex with him when he was 15 years old); King,
supra note 77, at 1190 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 362 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)) (arguing that where uncharged prior acts are admitted,
"the jury may believe that the defendant 'should be punished for that activity even
if he is not guilty of the offense charged"').
79. See Thomas C. Goldstein, et al., Relevancy and Its Limits, in The Evidence
Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence With Supporting Commentary,
171 F.R.D. 330, 490 (Thomas C. Goldstein ed., 1997) (arguing rape shield laws
spare victims embarrassment of discussing sexual history but Federal Rules 413 and
414 "disregard any such rights when applied to a defendant"). Goldstein argues
that rape shield laws de-emphasize the probative value of prior sexual history, but
Rules 413 and 414 stress the high probative value of prior sexual history. See id.
(arguing "the legislature has contradicted itself'); see also Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big
Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape, 86J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 815, 854 (1996) (stating "the rationale for halting the practice of
impeaching a complainant's testimony as to consent by use of her prior sexual
history is applicable, with nearly equal force, to the admission of prior bad acts
against a rape defendant"); Adam Kargman, Note, Three Maelstroms and One Tweak:
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 to 415 and Their Arizona Counterpart, 41 ARIz. L. REv.
963, n.242 ("By allowing plaintiffs [and prosecutors] to dirty up defendants, but
prohibiting defendants from dirtying up plaintiffs [and complainants], the federal
rules tilt trials heavily against defendants.").
80. See, e.g., United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (re-
jecting defendant's arguments that Rule 414 violated due process, equal protec-
tion and Eighth Amendment); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir.
1998) (rejecting defendant's arguments that Rule 413 violated due process and
equal protection); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting defendant's arguments that Rule 414 violated due process, equal protec-
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A. Rules 413 and 414 Are Not About Bad Character
Contrary to the assertions of critics, Rules 413 and 414 are not about
proving bad character in general. 8 1 Rather than allowing evidence of just
any uncharged bad acts, the rules focus only on relevant similar sexual
acts. 82 Only evidence of other crimes of the same type as the crime
charged is admissible under the rules.
8 3
B. Rules 413 and 414 Do Not Allow Evidence That Is Overly Prejudicial
Critics who argue that evidence of other acts will be prejudicial miss
the point. Evidence should not be excluded merely because it is prejudi-
cial; rather, it should be excluded only if its probative value is outweighed
by its prejudicial effect.8 4 Critics who argue that admission of evidence of
other acts is overly prejudicial give too little weight to the fact that Rules
413 and 414 allow, but do not require, the admission of other acts evi-
dence in sex crimes cases.
8 5
tion and Eighth Amendment); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433-34
(10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant's arguments that Rule 413 violated due pro-
cess and equal protection).
81. See 137 CONG. REc. S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (adding that rules do
not allow admission of evidence merely to show defendant "has a general disposi-
tion to engage in crime").
82. See id. (stressing that "the evidence must relate to other crimes by the
defendant that are of the same type-sexual assault or child molestation-as the
crime with which he is formally charged"); David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and
Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15, 22 (1994)
(noting "[t] his limits the number of incidents for which evidence may be offered
.. . [and] tends to ensure that the uncharged acts will have a high degree of
probative value .. "). Karp wrote Rules 413 and 414 while he was senior counsel
at the Office of Policy Development of the U.S. Department of Justice. See 140
CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (stating
Karp's address "provided a detailed account of the views of the legislative sponsors
and the administration concerning the proposed reform, and should also be con-
sidered an authoritative part of its legislative history").
83. See 137 CONG. REc. S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (stressing that "Rules
[413 and 414] do not authorize an open-ended enquiry into all the 'bad acts' the
defendant may have committed in the course of his life"); Karp, supra note 82, at
22 (noting that "requirement of similarity in kind to charged offense tends to en-
sure that uncharged acts will have a high degree of probative value, and will not be
mere distractions from the main issues").
84. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing for weighing of probative value of evi-
dence against prejudicial effect, not for exclusion of all prejudicial evidence);
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 673 A.2d 866, 870 (Pa. 1996) (noting that other crimes
evidence was prejudicial, but was not "unduly prejudicial" in this case). Further-
more, all evidence presented by the prosecution, not just other crimes evidence, is
prejudicial in that it increases the likelihood of conviction. See Karp, supra note 82,
at 22 (noting that most opponents of Rule 413 and 414 go beyond merely arguing
that other crimes evidence is prejudicial and instead argue that it is overly
prejudicial).
85. See Karp, supra note 82, at 19 (stating "these are rules of admissibility, and
not mandatory rules of admission"). Numerous cases have declined to admit other
crimes evidence in sex crimes cases since the enactment of Rules 413 and 414. See,
e.g., United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 602 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting trial court
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Furthermore, Rule 403, which requires exclusion of evidence that is
substantially more prejudicial than probative, continues to apply.8 6 Cases
interpreting Rules 413 and 414 continue to apply the Rule 403 balancing
analysis, admitting or excluding evidence based on the balance between
probative value and prejudice to the defendant. 87 For example, in United
States v. Larson88 and United States v. Guardia,89 the courts excluded evi-
dence of other sex crimes after finding it was more prejudicial than proba-
tive. 90 In Larson, the defendant was charged with transporting a child for
excluded evidence where it found "any probative value is substantially outweighed
by the resulting danger of unfair prejudice to [defendant] in having to defend
allegations so remote in time"); United States v. Guardia, 955 F. Supp. 115, 119
(D.N.M. 1997), affid, 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that "trial court has
the authority, if not the duty, to exclude evidence which will likely confuse the jury
on peripheral issues").
86. See 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari) (clarifying that "general standards of the rules of evidence will continue
to apply"); FED. R. EVD. 403 (stating that "evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
87. See, e.g., United States v. Guidry, 456 F.3d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 2006) (find-
ing that "[a] district court must apply the Rule 403 balancing test when consider-
ing the admission of evidence under Rule 413"); United States v. Norris, 428 F.3d
907, 914 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding trial court "properly balanced the probative value
of the prior act evidence against its prejudice as it is required to do"); United
States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 487 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that "Rule 413 does
not displace the court's authority pursuant to Rule 403 to exclude evidence of a
prior assault if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice"); United States v. Fitzgerald, 80 F. App'x 857, 863 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding "[e]vidence that is relevant under Rule 413 is also subject to Rule 403...
[and] must satisfy three elements: (1) the defendant must be accused of an offense
of sexual assault as defined by Rule 413(d); (2) the evidence must pertain to the
defendant's commission of another sexual assault offense; (3) and the evidence
must be relevant"); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1997)
(excluding evidence under Rule 403 and stating "[w]e view Rule 403 analysis in
connection with evidence offered under Rule 414 to be consistent with Congress's
intent as reflected in the legislative history"); United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d
658, 662 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting "[i]t is logical that Rule 403 applies to Rule 414
... and nothing in the language of Rule 414 precludes the application of Rule
403"); Petersen v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025 (D.S.D. 2005) (com-
menting "trial court was well aware of the requirements of Rule 403 and properly
applied the Rule to the facts and circumstances present"); United States v. Akram,
No. 97 CR 78, 1997 WL 392220, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1997) (applying Rule 403
test and finding "close factual and temporal connection between the assaults on
[other crimes witness] and the assaults on [complainants] make [witness's] addi-
tional testimony highly probative"); United States v. Guardia, 955 F. Supp. 115,
117-18 (D.N.M. 1997) affd, 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting "developing"
consensus ofjudges, lawyers, and legal scholars" who believe that Rule 403 applies
to Rule 413 and using 403 test to exclude evidence).
88. 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
89. 955 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.M. 1997).
90. See Larson, 112 F.3d at 602 (noting trial court "perform[ed] a Rule 403
balancing analysis, weighing the probative value of the evidence against its poten-
tial for unfair prejudice"); Guardia, 955 F. Supp. at 117 (concluding that "common
17
Khan: He Said, She Said: Why Pennsylvania Should Adopt Federal Rules of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the purpose of committing sex crimes and the trial court excluded evi-
dence that the defendant committed sex crimes more than twenty years
earlier.9 1 In Guardia, the court excluded evidence that the defendant, a
gynecologist charged with inappropriately touching a patient, behaved
similarly towards other patients. 92 The court found that the testimony of
the other patients would confuse the jury.9 3
In addition, restrictions on hearsay evidence continue to protect the
defendant from accusations based on unsubstantiated rumors.9 4 The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence generally prohibit hearsay, defined as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 95 Fur-
thermore, by imposing notice requirements on the prosecution, Rules 413
and 414 provide the defendant with an additional procedural
protection.
9 6
A defendant faced with evidence of other sexual crimes "still has the
same opportunities to respond to the proposed evidence of uncharged
sense reading of Rule 403 ... indicates that since it applies only to evidence other-
wise admissible, it applies to evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 413"); see
also United States v. Walker, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157-58 (D.N.D. 2003) (admit-
ting evidence of defendant's prior conviction for molesting different child but ex-
cluding evidence of prior uncharged crime). The Walker court concluded that
"the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and by other considerations enumerated
in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. (excluding evidence even
though it was relevant).
91. See Larson, 112 F.3d at 602 (admitting other evidence of more recent
crimes similar to charged crime).
92. See Guardia, 955 F. Supp. at 118-20 (noting that two non-complaining wit-
nesses testified that defendant fondled their breasts and buttocks and made inap-
propriate comments).
93. See id. at 118-19 (noting differences among witnesses' experiences and ne-
cessity of expert testimony).
94. See Scott, supra note 66, at 1737-38 (noting legislative history indicates in-
tent to subject Rules 413 and 414 to existing standards); see also United States v.
Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 957-58 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding doctor's testimony inadmissi-
ble hearsay because victim told him defendant had sexually abused her since she
was in first grade); United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1997)
(agreeing with Larson court that legislators intended hearsay rules to apply to Rule
414); Larson, 112 F.3d at 604 (quoting Congressional Record to indicate legislative
intent to subject Rule 414 to hearsay restrictions).
95. FED. R. EVID. 801 (c) (defining hearsay); see FED. R. EVID. 802 (providing
that hearsay is usually inadmissible); FED. R. EvID. 803-807 (listing exceptions to
general inadmissibility of hearsay evidence).
96. See FED. R. EvID. 413(b), 414(b) ("In a case in which the Government
intends to offer evidence under this rule, the attorney for the Government shall
disclose the evidence to the defendant ... at least fifteen days before the sched-
uled date of trial .... ); see also 137 CONG. REc. S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991)
(stressing importance of advance notice to defendant of prior acts evidence to be
offered at trial); Scott, supra note 66, at 1736-37 (noting that notice requirement
"does not exist when the defendant is formally and individually charged with all of
the offenses").
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sexual offenses as if it were a formally charged offense."9 7 At trial, the
defense has the opportunity to challenge the other crimes evidence by
cross-examining witnesses and presenting rebuttal evidence. 98
Concern that jurors will place too much weight on evidence of past
crimes "discredits the ability of jurors to behave reasonably in evaluating
evidence."9 9 Even when courts admit evidence of prior sexual crimes, ju-
ries may still find defendants not guilty.' 0 0 In Commonwealth v. Booth,10 1
the defendant, a sheriff, was charged with sexually assaulting a prisoner,
among other charges.' 0 2 The jury heard testimony from a number of in-
mates that the defendant also invited them into his living quarters, gave
them alcohol and sexually assaulted them.10 3 Even after hearing this testi-
mony, the jury acquitted the defendant of all of the sexual charges.10 4
97. Scott, supra note 66, at 1736 (noting defendant may file pre-trial motion
to exclude prejudicial evidence); see also Karp, supra note 82, at 24 ("The defen-
dant has the same rights and opportunities to respond to evidence of uncharged
offenses that he has in relation to a formally charged offense, including the assis-
tance of counsel, cross-examination of witnesses, and presentation of rebuttal evi-
dence."); Lombardi, supra note 29, at 125 (noting that "federal rules [413 and 414]
provide greater procedural protection to the defendant than if the defendant was
charged with an offense that was not of a sexual nature").
98. See Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and
Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 387 (1996) (ac-
knowledging argument that Rules 413 and 414 will be costly and time-consuming
"[b] ecause the defendant must have the opportunity to defend himself against any
uncharged priors"); Karp, supra note 82, at 18 (arguing that notice requirement
"ensures that the defendant will have an opportunity to prepare any response or
rebuttal"); Scott, supra note 66, at 1737 (arguing that rules do not deny defendant
fair trial).
99. Scott, supra note 66, at 1739 (explaining why jurors should be allowed to
consider other crimes evidence in sex offense trials); see also United States v. Cas-
tillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding juries capable of following "in-
structions to them that they consider only the crime charged in deciding whether to
convict").
100. See Commonwealth v. Booth, 435 A.2d 1220, 1226 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(holding that admission of prior acts evidence was appropriate because "a com-
mon plan or design was established"); Kathryn Holzka, Ex-Cop Found Guilty of Abuse:
Man Convicted on 6 of 44 Counts, ALBUQUERQUE J. (N.M.), Nov. 20, 2005, at 2
(describing case where jury found defendant not guilty of thirty-eight counts of
molesting his stepdaughter despite fact thatjury convicted defendant on six counts
"alleg[ing] the same basic criminal conduct"); William Booth, Jury Acquits Jackson
on All Charges, WASH. POST, June 14, 2005, Bus. Sec. (explaining jury acquitted
Michael Jackson of molestation charges even after hearing evidence that Jackson
molested other children).
101. 435 A.2d 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
102. See id. at 1222 (listing offenses of "involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
furnishing contraband, . . . indecent assault . . . facilitating escape, obstructing
administration of the law, and official oppression").
103. See id. at 1226 (noting that "[a]ll of the alleged acts were of similar
character").
104. See id. (stating that "[p]erhaps the best indication that the jury was not
inflamed by the 'other crimes' testimony is that they acquitted [defendant] of all
sex offenses").
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Finally, courts that are concerned about juries placing too much weight on
other crimes evidence may give cautionary instructions. 1
0 5
C. Uncharged and Remote Acts Should Be Admissible When Relevant and Not
Overly Prejudicial
Evidence of uncharged crimes or crimes that happened many years
before the charged offense is not necessarily more prejudicial than proba-
tive, as critics claim. 10 6 First, uncharged crimes were admissible in all
types of cases even before Rules 413 and 414.107 Second, evidence of un-
charged crimes may be "valid and important for [uncharged crimes']
bearing on a charged offense." 10 8 Third, prosecutors already have incen-
tives to charge offenses; they do not need the additional incentive of a rule
that disallows evidence of uncharged acts.10 9 Fourth, where a defendant
105. See, e.g., Petersen v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025 (D.S.D.
2005) (noting that "any prejudice that may have occurred was minimized by the
limiting instruction given to the jury immediately after the evidence was admit-
ted"). The jury instruction stated that "[Rule 413 evidence] certainly does not
prove that the [D]efendant sexually assaulted his estranged wife at the time al-
leged by the [G]overnment." Id. at n.5 (noting that other crimes evidence was
"relevant and substantially similar to the aggravated sexual abuse offense [defen-
dant] was convicted of").
106. See 137 CONG. REc. S3241-42 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (explaining why
uncharged crimes should be admissible and why there should be no time limits on
other crimes evidence admitted).
107. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... may... be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court
excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Id.; see also Huddleson v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (holding evidence
of uncharged acts similar to charged offense admissible where "there is sufficient
evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar
[uncharged] act"); Karp, supra note 82, at 24 (stressing that uncharged acts were
already admissible under Rule 404(b)).
108. 137 CONG. REc. S3241 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (noting that there are
"entirely legitimate reasons" why it is "impossible, or undesirable" to bring charges
in some cases). One such reason is that "the uncharged offenses may have taken
place in a different jurisdiction." Id. (explaining that "[t]his would occur in a
state prosecution of a rapist or child molester whose earlier known crimes were
committed in a different state"). Additionally, there may be "insufficient evidence
or other practical difficulties in prosecuting all of the defendant's prior offenses as
separate counts [while at the same time] the evidence regarding the earlier of-
fenses is legitimately relevant to proof of the charged offense." Id. (noting this
occurs when "fathers or stepfathers ... are accused of molesting their daughters"
repeatedly over many years).
109. See id. (listing existing incentives). For example, "[c]harging a larger
number of counts tends to reduce the risk that the defendant will be entirely ac-
quitted if the jury is not persuaded concerning a particular charge or charges." Id.
(arguing existing incentives are sufficient). In addition, a prosecutor who brings
multiple charges has a greater chance of getting convictions on multiple counts,
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has committed crimes in more than one jurisdiction it may be impossible
to charge all crimes in one court.11 0 Fifth, victims who would find an en-
tire trial too demanding might be able to testify as part of another case. 111
Like evidence of uncharged acts, evidence of crimes that are remote
in time to the charged offense was admissible before the enactment of
Rules 413 and 414.112 Furthermore, evidence of crimes remote in time
from the date of the crime charged should be admissible when it is still
probative. 1 3 In United States v. Meacham,114 the defendant was charged
with transporting his minor relative across state lines for the purpose of
engaging in sexual acts." 5 The appeals court held that evidence that the
defendant had molested his stepdaughters more than thirty years earlier
when they were children was admissible. 116 The court found that the
prosecution could use such evidence to "show defendant's intent, at the
time he induced this minor relative to accompany him on an interstate
trip, to sexually molest her."'" 7
which will increase the defendant's sentence. See id. (stating that "[u]nder the
federal sentencing guidelines, for example, uncharged offenses may be given some
weight in sentencing, but the largest determinants of the sentence are normally
the offenses for which the defendant is convicted and his record of prior
convictions").
110. See Karp, supra note 82, at 25 (arguing in this situation that only way to
make jury "aware of all relevant criminal conduct of the defendant" is to admit
evidence of uncharged offenses).
111. See id. (noting that victims of rape or child molestation are often "too
traumatized, intimidated, or humiliated to file a complaint and go through the full
course of proceedings in a criminal prosecution" but "are often willing to bear the
more limited burden of testifying at the offender's trial for raping or molesting
another person, when they find out that the person who marred their lives has also
victimized others"); cf Rachel L. Melissa, Comment, Oregon's Response to the Impact
of Domestic Violence on Children, 82 OR. L. REv. 1125, 1141 (2003) (noting that one
"factor[ ] [that] contribute[s] to trauma resulting from testimony in criminal tri-
als" is "number of times the child has to testify and length of the trial").
112. See 140 CONG. REc. H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari) (discussing cases where courts admitted evidence of crimes that oc-
curred fifteen and twenty years before charged offense).
113. See 137 CONG. REc. S3242 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (stating "there is nojustification for categorically excluding offenses that occurred before some arbi-
trarily specified temporal limit"); Lombardi, supra note 29, at 126 (discussing
United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997), where court held that
evidence that defendant molested other relatives thirty years earlier was
admissible).
114. 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997).
115. See Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1490 (noting that defendant was charged with
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423).
116. See id. at 1495 (concluding "stepdaughters' testimony suggests a similar
pattern of sexual abuse of female minor relatives made possible by exploitation of
familial authority").
117. Id. at 1492 (noting that such evidence would be admissible under Rule
404(b) or Rule 414).
2007]
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On the other hand, courts have excluded evidence of old crimes if
they find such evidence to be unfair to the defendant.1 18 For example, in
Larson, the court admitted evidence of prior crimes that occurred sixteen
to twenty years before trial but excluded evidence that occurred twenty-
one to twenty-three years before trial. 119 The court found that the "proba-
tive value [of the older evidence was] substantially outweighed by the re-
sulting danger of unfair prejudice to [the defendant] .... 120
D. Rules 413 and 414 Are Not Inconsistent with Rape Shield Laws
The criticisms that Rules 413 and 414 are inconsistent with rape
shield laws are not justified because the two types of evidence involved
serve different purposes. 12 1 Rape shield laws encourage victims to come
forward; on the other hand, excluding evidence about the defendant's
past does not encourage the defendant to talk to authorities. 12 2 Further,
rape shield laws protect victims' privacy, but "[v]iolent sex crimes [com-
mitted by the defendant] are not a private act.' 23 Moreover, evidence of
118. See Lombardi, supra note 29, at 126 (discussing United States v. Larson,
112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997), where court excluded some evidence of prior crimes);
see also United States v. Acevedo, No. 96-2149, 1997 WL 392253, at *1-4 (10th Cir.
July 14, 1997) (affirming district court's admission evidence of prior sex crimes for
rebuttal, where district court had held evidence was not admissible in prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief because it was "too remote in time").
119. See Larson, 112 F.3d at 602 (noting witnesses were to testify that defen-
dant sexually assaulted them when they were minors in case where defendant was
charged with transporting minor across state lines with intent to engage in sexual
acts with him).
120. Id. (stating that events were "too remote in time to have any probative
value in this case").
121. See 137 CONG. REC. S3241 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (analysis of rules)
("The sound policies that underlie the rape victim shield laws provide no support
for comparable restrictions in relation to the conduct of the defendant."); Karp,
supra note 82, at 23-24 (calling criticism of rules based on comparison to rape
shield laws "superficial").
122. See 137 CONG. REc. S3241 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (analysis of rules)
("[T]he rape victim shield laws serve the important purpose of encouraging vic-
tims to report rapes and cooperate in prosecution.... Rules limiting disclosure at
trial of the defendant's commission of other rapes do not further any comparable
public purpose."); Karp, supra note 82, at 24 (stating that "[t] he defendant's coop-
eration is not required for prosecution"); Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and
the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FoRD-
HAM URB. L.J. 271, 277 (1995) (arguing that "revealing . . . evidence [of defen-
dant's prior crimes] would not suppress conduct that society wants to promote").
123. Karp, supra note 82, at 24 (arguing that "defendant can claim no privacy
interest in suppressing [evidence of violent sex crimes] when they are relevant to
the determination of a later criminal charge"); see also 137 CONG. REc. S3241
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (analysis of rules) ("[V]iolent sex crimes are not private
acts, and the defendant can claim no legitimate interest in suppressing evidence
that he has engaged in such acts when it is relevant to the determination of a later
criminal charge."); Park, supra note 122, at 277 (stating that defendant's "personal
interest in maintaining the secrecy of his criminal act is not one that society need
to accept as valid").
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defendant's past sex crimes is more probative than evidence of the victim's
sexual history. 124 Many argue that the victim's sexual history is not proba-
tive regarding whether she consented to sex with the defendant, while the
defendant's prior rapes are probative regarding whether he is capable of
such a crime.1 25 Thus, it does not make sense to compare rape shield laws
that protect victims' sexual history to the admissibility of evidence regard-
ing the defendant's past violent sexual acts. 1
26
E. Rules 413 and 414 Are Constitutional
Courts have held that Rules 413 and 414 do not, on their face, violate
due process or equal protection. 12 7 Defendants have alleged that Rules
413 and 414 violate due process because they conflict with a tradition of
excluding propensity evidence, "create[ ] a presumption of guilt," and al-
low a jury to punish the defendant for past acts. 128 The rules do not vio-
late due process, however, because courts have historically admitted
124. See Karp, supra note 82, at 24 (noting "[i]nquiry into [victim's] sexual
history will normally disclose nothing that particularly distinguishes her from the
general population"). Further, rape shield laws allow evidence of the victim's sex-
ual history in certain circumstances when it may be probative and arguably in some
cases even when it is not probative. See Anderson, supra note 58, at 55-56 (criticiz-
ing exceptions in federal rape shield law that allow evidence of victim's sexual
history with defendant and admission of victim's sexual history generally when ex-
clusion would violate defendant's constitutional rights).
125. See Karp, supra note 82, at 24 (arguing "evidence showing that the defen-
dant has committed sexual assaults on other occasions places him in a small class
of depraved criminals"); Park, supra note 122, at 277-78 (arguing that evidence
"the victim frequently consented to casual sex ... tends to show, however slightly,
that she is more likely to have consented to casual sex on a particular occasion
than another woman who never consents. It also tends, however, to show that she
does not readily make accusations of rape").
126. For a further discussion of the inherent differences between the victim's
sexual history and defendant's prior convictions for sexual offenses, see supra
notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
127. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
Rule 414 did not violate due process); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801
(8th Cir. 1998) (holding Rule 413 did not violate due process or equal protection);
United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding Rule 414 did
not violate due process or equal protection); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d
1427, 1433-34 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding Rule 413 did not violate due process or
equal protection).
128. See LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1024 (rejecting defendant's argument that "tradi-
tional rule precluding the use of a defendant's prior bad acts to prove his disposi-
tion to commit the type of crime charged is so ingrained in Anglo-American
jurisprudence as to be embodied in the due process clause of the Constitution");
Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1432:
The due process arguments against the constitutionality of Rule 413 are
that it prevents a fair trial, because of 'settled usage'-that the ban
against propensity evidence has been honored by the courts for such a
long time that it 'must be taken to be due process of law'; because it
creates a presumption of guilt that undermines the requirement that the
prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and because if
tendered to demonstrate the defendant's criminal disposition it licenses
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propensity evidence and because Rule 403 protects the defendant by ex-
cluding evidence that is overly prejudicial. 129
As for equal protection, the rules do not "burden a fundamental
right" and defendants in sex crimes cases are not a "suspect class." 3 0
Therefore, courts "must uphold the legislative classification so long as it
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."' 3 1 Courts have held that
"effective prosecution of sex offenses is a legitimate end."13 2 Congress ac-
ted rationally in adopting Rules 413 and 414 because it had "good rea-
sons" to believe "the rule[s] [were] 'justified by the distinctive
characteristics of the cases it will affect.'"l3
the jury to punish the defendant for past acts, eroding the presumption
of innocence that is fundamental in criminal trials.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
129. See LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1025-27 (finding "there is nothing fundamentally
unfair about the allowance of propensity evidence under Rule 414"). The court
found that historical practice was unclear and did not completely resolve the due
process issue. See id. at 1025 (noting that "Supreme Court has held that the pri-
mary guide for determining whether a rule is so 'fundamental' as to be embodied
in the Constitution is historical practice"). While courts generally exclude propen-
sity evidence, courts have allowed such evidence in sex crimes cases. See id. at 1025-
26 (discussing history and current "lustful disposition" exceptions).
130. See Mound, 149 F.3d at 801 (explaining why rational basis review ap-
plied). As another court stated, defendants have "no fundamental right to have a
trial free from relevant propensity evidence that is not unduly prejudicial." LeMay,
260 F.3d at 1030 (noting "Rule 403 ensures that evidence which is so prejudicial as
to jeopardize a defendant's right to a fair trial will be excluded"). In LeMay, the
court rejected a Native American defendant's equal protection argument, finding
that even if Federal Rules 413 and 414 disproportionately affected Native Ameri-
cans, this was "because the federal government only has jurisdiction over crimes
such as child molestation when they arise on Indian Reservations, military bases, or
other federal enclaves." See id. (finding no congressional intent to discriminate).
131. Mound, 149 F.3d at 801 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631
(1996)) (asserting "[a]ppellate courts should not and do not try 'to determine
whether [the statute] was the correct judgment or whether it best accomplishes
Congressional objectives; rather, [courts] determine [only] whether Congress'[s]
judgment was rational"').
132. Id. (applying first step in rational basis review); see also United States v.
Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433)
("Congress' [s] objective of enhancing effective prosecution of sexual assaults is a
legitimate interest.").
133. LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028 (quoting 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug.
21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)) (noting "characteristics included the reli-
ance of sex offense cases on difficult credibility determinations that 'would other-
wise become unresolvable swearing matches,' as well as, in the case of child sexual
abuse, the 'exceptionally probative' value of a defendant's sexual interest in chil-
dren"); see also Castillo, 140 F.3d at 883 ("The government has a particular need for
corroborating evidence in cases of sexual abuse of a child because of the highly
secretive nature of these sex crimes and because often the only available proof is
the child's testimony."); Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1434 ("The nature of sex offense pros-
ecutions frequently involves victim-witnesses who are traumatized and unable to
effectively testify, and offenders often have committed many similar crimes before
their arrest on the charged crime.").
[Vol. 52: p. 641
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Courts have also held that Rules 413 and 414 do not violate the
Eighth Amendment. 134 Defendants have argued that Rules 413 and 414
violate the Eighth Amendment because admitting evidence of prior
crimes has such a prejudicial effect that it constitutes punishment.,3 5 This
argument is ineffective because "[t]he rule[s] do[ ] not impose criminal
punishment at all; [they are] merely ... evidentiary rule[s]. 1 3 6 Further-
more, admission of other crimes evidence is not so prejudicial that juries
would convict based on uncharged crimes.' 37 Thus, Rules 413 and 414
withstand multiple constitutional challenges.1 3 8
IV. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF EVIDENCE AND
PENNSYLVANIA CASE LAW
A. The Pennsylvania Rules
In 1998, Pennsylvania adopted Rules of Evidence modeled after the
Federal Rules. 13 9 Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Pennsylvania
134. See LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1031 (holding Rule was not cruel and unusual
punishment); Castillo, 140 F.3d at 884 (holding Rule 414 "does not impose crimi-
nal punishment"). The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting government from imposing cruel
and unusual punishment).
135. See Castillo, 140 F.3d at 884 (rejecting defendant's argument "that be-
cause the evidence [of other crimes] has such a strong prejudicial effect on juries,
Rule 414 works as a de facto punishment for one's status as a sex offender").
136. Id. (rejecting defendant's argument that Rule 414 "punishes him for his
status as a person with a sexual interest in minors"); see also LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1031
(relying on Castillo court's rationale).
137. See Castillo, 140 F.3d at 884 (reasoning that for other crimes evidence to
be so prejudicial that it amounts to punishment, "juries would have to ignore
courts' instructions to them that they consider only the crime charged in deciding
whether to convict"). The court stressed that "[a] central assumption of our juris-
prudence is that juries follow the instructions they receive." Id. (rejecting argu-
ment that evidence was so prejudicial as to be punishment); see also LeMay, 260
F.3d at 1031 (finding that "prosecution's other witnesses provided enough evi-
dence that we are convinced that LeMay was not convicted for his status as a sex
offender").
138. For a discussion of the constitutionality of Rules 413 and 414, see supra
notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
139. See DAVID F. BINDER, BINDER ON PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE ix, xi (3d ed.
2003) (discussing history of evidentiary rules in America and Pennsylvania); Mary
Ellen Fox, Pa. Evidence Rules Now on the Books: The Consolidation Should be Helpful, but
Questions Remain, PA. LAW WEEKLY, May 18, 1998, at 1 ("The rules adopted by the
court are modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence ... [but] [t] there are some
notable exceptions from.., federal rules ...."); Michael A. Riccardi, Supreme Court
Releases Evidence Code; Greenleaf: Legislature to Add Final Touches, THE LEGAL INTELLI-
CENCER, May 11, 1998, at 1 ("The new Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence are fash-
ioned after the Federal Rules of Evidence, and brings the commonwealth into the
majority of jurisdictions that have codified evidence rules.").
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Supreme Court has the power to create rules of evidence. 140 Among the
Federal Rules that Pennsylvania chose not to adopt were Rules 413 and
414.'14
While opting not to adopt Rules 413 and 414, Pennsylvania did adopt
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which governs the admissibility of evidence of
"other crimes, wrongs or acts" in all types of cases, making no exception
for sex crimes cases. 142 According to Rule 404(b), evidence of other acts
is not admissible to prove bad character.143 Other acts evidence is admis-
sible, however, "for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
accident." '
44
B. Trends in Caselaw
At one point before Pennsylvania adopted its Rules of Evidence, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that:
[W]hen a defendant is charged with the commission of a sexual
offence the law is more liberal in admitting as proof of his guilt
evidence of similar sexual offences committed by him than it is in
admitting evidence of similar offences when a defendant is
charged with the commission of non-sexual crimes.
145
In Commonwealth v. Shively, 14 6 however, a plurality of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court subsequently held that the admissibility of prior acts evi-
dence is no different for sex crimes cases than for other cases. 147 An ex-
140. See generally BINDER, supra note 139 (noting that Article 5, Section 10(c)
of Pennsylvania Constitution gives Court power "to prescribe general rules gov-
erning practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts" in state).
141. Compare FED. R. EV. art. IV (listing Rules 401 through 415), with PA. R.
EVID. art. IV (adopting Rules 401 to 411, which are similar or identical to corre-
sponding Federal Rules, but not Rules 412 to 415).
142. See PA. R. EID. 404(b) (excluding other crimes evidence generally and
providing limited exceptions).
143. See PA. R. EVID. 404(b) (1) (stating "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith").
144. PA. R. EVID. 404(b) (2) (providing, in limited circumstances, exception to
general rule of exclusion).
145. Commonwealth v. Kline, 65 A.2d 348, 352 (Pa. 1949), overruled by Com-
monwealth v. Shively, 424 A.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Pa. 1981) (stating "we explicitly
overrule Kline . . . and hold that sexual and non-sexual crimes must be treated
alike in deciding whether evidence of prior criminal activity should be admitted").
146. 424 A.2d 1257 (Pa. 1981).
147. See id. at 1259-60 (citing MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 190 n.40 (1972 2d
ed.)) (stating "sexual and non-sexual crimes must be treated alike in deciding
whether evidence of prior criminal activity should be admitted"). One court
noted, however, that this statement in Shively was in a plurality opinion, and found
that Kline was still valid law. See Commonwealth v. Powers, 577 A.2d 194, 197 n.1
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (noting "[n]o subsequent decision by our Supreme Court
has embraced the dictum of the lead opinion of the Shively plurality").
[Vol. 52: p. 641
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amination of recent case law on sex crimes reveals a tension between the
text of Rule 404(b) and the Shively opinion on one hand, and a trend
toward admitting evidence of other acts in sex crimes cases to bolster the
victim's credibility on the other.1 48
For example, recent Pennsylvania case law contains a number of ex-
ceptions that permit the admission of other acts evidence that are not ex-
plicitly included in the Rules of Evidence. 149 Specifically, both before and
after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Rules of Evidence,
Pennsylvania courts have held that evidence of other acts is admissible to
show:
(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a
common scheme plan or design embracing commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
prove the others; or (5) to establish the identity of the person
charged with the commission of the crime on trial. .... 150
Further, evidence of other acts is admissible when it is "part of the
history of the case and forms part of the natural development of the
facts." 151 Finally, evidence of other acts is admissible to "show a passion or
propensity for illicit sexual relations with the particular person concerned
in the crime on trial."1 5 2 Some have questioned the continued validity of
148. For a further discussion of the trend towards admitting other acts evi-
dence in sex crimes cases, see infra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
149. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania case law exceptions that permit
admission of other acts evidence, see infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
150. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 364 A.2d 944, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Peterson, 307 A.2d 264, 269 (Pa. 1973)) (holding
other crimes evidence was inadmissible due to lapse of time between offenses); see
also Commonwealth v. Judd, 897 A.2d 1224, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (refuting
argument that "'common scheme or plan' exclusion has been called into doubt
based on the fact that it is not listed in Rule 404(b) (2)"); Commonwealth v. Lauro,
819 A.2d 100, 107 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding trial court properly consolidated
cases where defendant was charged with molesting his daughter and
stepdaughter).
151. Lauro, 819 A.2d at 107 (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418,
422 (Pa. 1997)) (noting that Post Conviction Relief Act Court had found defen-
dant's molestation of his daughter and stepdaughter were "of similar character
and suggested a common plan"); see also Commonwealth v. Wattley, 880 A.2d 682,
687-88 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (upholding admission of evidence of defendant's
prior conviction for sex crime in Texas because it was "part of the history and
natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant [was]
charged"), appeal granted, 901 A.2d 498 (Pa. May 30, 2006) (No. 896 MAL 2005);
Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 640 A.2d 1368, 1372 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (uphold-
ing admission of defendant's prior uncharged sex crimes against victim in part
because they were "were part of the history of the instant assault").
152. Commonwealth v. Buser, 419 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
(quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 449) (upholding admission of daugh-
ter's testimony about previous incidents in which defendant, her father, sexually
abused her); see also Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 831, 839 (Pa. 1992)
(upholding admission of testimony that defendant, charged with sexually assault-
ing his stepdaughter, had watched her showering and fondled her breasts on previ-
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the "lustful disposition" exception because the Rules of Evidence do not
mention it.' 5 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has declined
to adhere to a specific list of exceptions, instead choosing to admit evi-
dence of other crimes whenever the probative value outweighs the poten-
tial for prejudice.15 4 For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
recognized the "common plan, scheme or design" exception, which is not
listed in the Rules of Evidence, as recently as 2004.155
Although once opposed to admission of other acts evidence in sex
crimes cases, Pennsylvania courts appear to be increasingly willing to ad-
mit such evidence and have recently recognized that such evidence may be
necessary to "bolster the victim's credibility." t 5 6 In 1976, in Commonwealth
ous occasions); Wattley, 880 A.2d at 684-85, 686-87 (upholding, on numerous
grounds including "lustful disposition exception," admission of evidence that de-
fendant had subsequently sexually abused same victim in another state); Common-
wealth v. Ritchie, 472 A.2d 220, 223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (upholding admission of
thirteen-year-old victim's testimony that defendant "had been sexually molesting
her three or four times a week for a period of about four years," even though
victim could not recall precise dates of previous incidents), remanded on other
grounds by 502 A.2d 148 (Pa. Dec 11, 1985) (No. 69 W.D. 1984) (holding defendant
had right to view Children and Youth Services file), cert. granted, Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 476 U.S. 1139 (U.S. May 27, 1986) (No. 85-1347) affd in part and rev'd in
part, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (holding defendant could not view Children and Youth
Services file, but trial court could).
153. See Wattley, 880 A.2d at 688-89 (McEwen, J., dissenting) (arguing that by
continuing to recognize "lustful disposition exception," majority effectively incor-
porated Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 into Pennsylvania Rules of
Evidence).
154. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 303 (Pa. 1988) (finding that
list of "'special circumstances' [previously articulated by court] is not exclusive,
and this Court has demonstrated it will recognize additional exceptions to the gen-
eral rule where the probative value of the evidence outweighs the tendency to
prejudice the jury"); see also PA. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts may be admitted for... purposes [ ] such as proof of motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or acci-
dent.") (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Horvath, 781 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2001) (stating there is no set list of purposes for which other crimes
evidence is admissible and "the Court has demonstrated it will recognize addi-
tional exceptions to the general rule where the probative value of evidence out-
weighs the tendency to prejudice the jury").
155. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 864 A.2d 460, 481 (Pa. 2004)) (stating
evidence of other crimes was admissible to show "common plan, scheme or design
embracing commission of multiple crimes"). But see EDwARD D. OHLBAUM,
OHLBAUM ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF EVIDENCE § 404.22[4] (Matthew Bender
2006) (calling sex crimes cases that relied solely on "common plan, scheme, or
design" exception "of questionable utility in light of Rule 404(b)"). TheJudd court
responded to questions raised by Ohlbaum and other scholars, stating it was a
"settled rule" that evidence of other crimes is admissible to show "common plan,
scheme or design." Judd, 897 A.2d at 1231 ("[O]ur Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recently reiterated the settled rule of admissibility regarding evidence which dem-
onstrates a defendant's criminal tendencies by way of a common plan, scheme or
design.").
156. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 836 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
(finding evidence of prior sexual assault of child admissible where current victim's
credibility was damaged because he delayed reporting). Compare Commonwealth
668 [Vol. 52: p. 641
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v. Bradley,' 57 the court reversed the defendant's conviction for forcible
anal sodomy of a mentally handicapped child, holding that the trial court
had improperly admitted evidence that the defendant sodomized other
mentally handicapped children at the same school. 158 In Bradley, two for-
mer students testified at trial that the defendant had repeatedly molested
them and two former students testified that they had seen the defendant
sodomize other students.1 59 The appellate court found that the prior acts
were too remote to be considered part of a common scheme or plan be-
cause the incidents could have happened three years before the charged
offense.1 60 The court also questioned the credibility of the mentally hand-
icapped children, but, at the same time, said that the testimony of the
victim of the charged offense might be sufficient for a conviction. 16 1 Fur-
ther, the court noted that "the Commonwealth may suffer certain practical
problems" due to the inability to present the testimony of the other chil-
dren but that "its case is not totally destroyed.
1 62
Twenty years later, however, in Commonwealth v. Gordon,163 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court recognized the need to admit the testimony of
prior victims in order to strengthen a case that consisted of the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of the victim. 164 In Gordon, the defendant, a lawyer
charged with indecently assaulting a client, had previously been convicted
v. Bradley, 364 A.2d 944, 949 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (excluding evidence that super-
visor at boys' school charged with sodomizing mentally handicapped child had
sodomized other mentally handicapped students), and Commonwealth v. Shively,
424 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Pa. 1981) (finding prior incident of forcible sodomy too
dissimilar to current case, which also involved sodomy charge), with Common-
wealth v. Gordon, 673 A.2d 866, 870 (Pa. 1996) (finding evidence of other sex
crimes necessary to corroborate victim's testimony), and O'Brien, 836 A.2d at 970
(holding admission of other crimes evidence was relevant to "bolster the victim's
credibility").
157. 364 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
158. See id. at 945-46 (calling evidence of prior molestation of other children
"random and remote acts not relevant in establishing that appellant acted accord-
ing to an explicit and premeditated plan [with regard to crime charged]").
159. See id. at 945 (noting one former student testified that defendant "com-
mitted forcible acts of anal intercourse on four separate occasions" and another
testified defendant "forced him to perform oral sodomy five or six times").
160. See id. at 946-47 (noting victims' and witnesses' inability to recall exact
dates).
161. See id. at 949 (stating only evidence of prior acts "is the testimony of
people who were teenagers and limited intellectually at the time the acts were
allegedly committed"). This reasoning is particularly frustrating, given the ten-
dency of sexual predators to choose victims whose credibility will likely be ques-
tioned. See Larsen, supra note 13, at 195 (noting that "[i]nterviews of convicted
rapists have revealed that some perpetrators are skilled at selecting victims whom
they know will be perceived as less believable, making them 'easy pickings"').
162. See Bradley, 364 A.2d at 949 (noting that victim's testimony "if believed by
the jury" could be enough for conviction).
163. 673 A.2d 866 (Pa. 1996).
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of similar assaults on other clients. 165 The court recognized the need to
admit other crimes evidence because it was difficult for the Common-
wealth to establish lack of consent without any evidence beyond the vic-
tim's personal testimony:
Whether relevant evidence is unduly prejudicial is a function in
part of the degree to which it is necessary to prove the case of the
opposing party. Here, the Commonwealth was required to prove
that a non-consensual touching occurred, the purpose of which
was sexual gratification. [Defendant] denies that the touching
occurred, and since the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged
victim in this case might reasonably lead a jury to determine that
there was a reasonable doubt as to whether [defendant] commit-
ted the crime charged, it is fair to conclude that the other crimes
evidence is necessary for the prosecution of the case.
16 6
In cases since Gordon, Pennsylvania courts seem more willing to admit
other crimes evidence, recognizing the need to bolster the credibility of
sex crimes victims. 167 For example, in Commonwealth v. O'Brien,'1 68 the vic-
tim was just ten years old when the defendant "attempted to insert his
penis into [the victim's] anus," and the victim did not report the assault
immediately because "he was afraid it was his fault."1 69 The appellate
court found that where the victim's credibility was in doubt due to his
delay in reporting the crime, evidence that the defendant engaged in simi-
lar sexual acts with another child was admissible to "bolster the victim's
credibility.,, 1 70
There is reason to question the continued validity of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's statement that evidence of other acts should be treated
no differently in sex crimes cases than in other cases.17 1 Pennsylvania
165. See id. at 869 (listing numerous similarities between circumstances of
crime charged and previous crimes).
166. Id. at 870 (noting indecent assault requires lack of consent and "touch-
ing of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing
or gratifying sexual desire, in either person").
167. See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 836 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
(admitting evidence of prior sexual assaults); Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d
877, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (admitting testimony regarding defendant's sexual
assault of daughter in trial where defendant was accused of statutory rape and rape
of his stepdaughter).
168. 836 A.2d 966 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
169. Id. at 968 (quoting trial court opinion and noting victim did not disclose
abuse until his mother found him sexually assaulting his brother); see also Com-
monwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 831, 836 (Pa. 1992) (recognizing unique
problems of child victims of sexual abuse that may cause children to delay report-
ing crime, omit details of crime and forget exact dates of crime).
170. See O'Brien, 836 A.2d at 968, 970 (finding evidence of similar crimes
showed "common, scheme plan or design").
171. For a further discussion of Shively, see supra notes 145-70 and accompa-
nying text.
670 [Vol. 52: p. 641
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cases have recognized the unique characteristics of sex crimes, and even
suggested that evidence of other crimes is sometimes necessary to help the
prosecution in light of challenges such as the lack of evidence beyond the
victim's testimony and the need to prove lack of consent.'
72
While Pennsylvania courts, in cases involving the admission of evi-
dence of other crimes, have gradually moved towards recognizing the
unique characteristics of sex crimes, the courts have more explicitly recog-
nized the unique nature of sex crimes in cases involving Megan's Law.
173
The courts' discussion of sex offenders' recidivist tendencies in Megan's
Law jurisprudence supports the argument that evidence of other sex
crimes is particularly probative and that standards for its admission should
be adjusted accordingly. 174
V. STATUTORY EVIDENCE OF PENNSYLVANIA'S RECOGNITION OF UNIQUE
NATURE OF SEX CRIMES
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Pennsylvania legislature has adopted
laws recognizing the unique characteristics of sex crimes, including recidi-
vism among offenders. 175 Perhaps the clearest example of this trend was
the enactment of Megan's Law, which the Pennsylvania legislature passed
172. For a discussion of Pennsylvania case law treatment of admissibility other
crimes evidence, see supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text (discussing recent
cases where courts have admitted other crimes evidence in light of challenges in
prosecuting sex crimes cases).
173. See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 838 A.2d 710, 716 n.8 (Pa. 2003)
(quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)) ("When convicted sex offenders
reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be
rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault."); Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d
962, 981 (Pa. 2001) (quoting same passage); Commonwealth v. Miller, 664 A.2d
1310, 1318 (Pa. 1995) (stating evidence of other crimes may not be introduced for
sole purpose of "indicat[ing] the defendant's propensity to commit similar
crimes"), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Commonwealth v. McCrae, 832
A.2d 1026, 1037 (Pa. 2003) (stating "Court abrogated the relaxed waiver rule");
Commonwealth v. Mullins, 5 A.2d 1009, 1017 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (quoting Cut-
shall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 1999)) ("In this regard, it has been
noted that 'Congress, and the legislatures of the several states, have considered the
egregiousness of sexual crimes, particularly where children are concerned, and
studies have indicated that sexual offenders have high rates of recidivism."'). For a
further discussion of Megan's Law, see infra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
174. See United States v. Mann, 193 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Un-
charged prior sexual acts are probative if they are similar to the charged crimes.");
140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (ar-
guing that evidence of defendant's past acts of molestation is "exceptionally proba-
tive because it shows an unusual disposition of the defendant-a sexual or
sadosexual interest in children-that simply does not exist in ordinary people");
Karp, supra note 82, at 22 (noting that evidence of similar sexual offenses "[has] a
high degree of probative value, and will not be [a] mere distraction [ ] from the
main issues").
175. For a further discussion of Megan's law, recent increases in sentences for
sex offenses, recent addition of certain sex crimes to three strikes law, Jessica's Law
and SB 1054, see infra notes 176-97 and accompanying text.
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unanimously without debate in 1995.176 Megan's Law requires all con-
victed sex offenders to register with the state police. 17 7 Additional provi-
sions apply when an offender is found to be a "sexually violent
predator."' 78 First, the police must notify the community where the of-
176. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791, 9792, 9795.1-9799.4, 9799.7-9799.9
(West Supp. 2006) (providing special rules for convicted sex offenders in order to
protect public); Michael Bell, Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Community Notification Law:
Will it Protect Communities from Repeat Sex Offenders?, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 635, 637 (1996)
(arguing community notification provision would not protect public from repeat
sex offenders).
177. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9795.1 (West Supp. 2006) (requiring either
ten-year or lifetime registration, depending on crime committed). A ten-year re-
gistration requirement applies to:
individuals convicted of any of the following offenses: 18 Pa.C.S. § 2901
(relating to kidnapping) where the victim is a minor; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2910
(relating to luring a child into a motor vehicle); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.2 (re-
lating to institutional sexual assault); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (relating to inde-
cent assault) where the offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree; 18
Pa.C.S. § 4302 (relating to incest) where the victim is 12 years of age or
older but under 18 years of age; 18 PaC.S. §5902(b) (relating to prostitu-
tion and related offenses) where the actor promotes the prostitution of a
minor; 18 Pa.C.S. § 5903(a)(3), (4), (5) or (6) (relating to obscene and
other sexual materials and performances) where the victim is a minor; 18
Pa.C.S. § 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318
(relating to unlawful contact with a minor); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6320 (relating to
sexual exploitation of children).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9795.1 (West Supp. 2006) (providing that registration
requirement also applies to anyone convicted of attempt of any of above listed
crimes). A lifetime registration requirement applies to anyone convicted of two or
more of the crimes listed in § 9795.1 (a) (1), 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 9795.1(b) (1), "sexually violent predators," 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 97951.(b) (3), and people convicted of:
18 Pa.C.S. § 3121 (relating to rape); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123 (relating to invol-
untary deviate sexual intercourse); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1 (relating to sexual
assault); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent assault); 18
Pa.C.S. § 4302 (relating to incest) when the victim is under 12 years of
age.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9795.1(b) (2) (West Supp. 2006) (requiring lifetime re-
gistration for specified offenders).
178. For a discussion of the additional requirements imposed for sexually vio-
lent predators, see infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing commu-
nity notification and counseling requirements). A "sexually violent predator" is:
[a] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as set
forth in section 9795.1 (relating to registration) and who is determined
to be a sexually violent predator under section 9795.1 (relating to assess-
ments) due to mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the
person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. The term
includes an individual determined to be a sexually violent predator where
the determination occurred in the United States or one of its territories
or possessions, another state, the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign nation or by court martial.
42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9792 (West Supp. 2006) (defining sexually violent
predator for purposes of community notification and counseling provisions). Af-
ter a person is convicted of an offense requiring registration, a member of the
State Sexual Offenders Assessment Board performs an assessment to determine
whether to classify the offender as a sexually violent predator. 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
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fender lives. 179  Second, a "sexually violent predator" must attend
counseling.
18 °
Megan's Law is unique in that there is no comparable statute that
provides for registration and community notification with regard to non-
sexual offenses. 18 1 One of the legislative findings behind Megan's Law
was that "sexually violent predators pose a high risk of engaging in further
offenses even after being released from incarceration or commitments
and that protection of the public from this type of offender is a para-
mount governmental interest."18
2
The Pennsylvania legislature's view that sex crimes are different from
other crimes is also evident in the 2002 amendments to sections 3121 and
3123 of Title 18.183 These amendments increased the penalties for rape
of a child and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child from
twenty to forty years; they increased the penalties for rape of a child with
serious bodily injury and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a
child with serious bodily injury from twenty years to life. 184 In contrast,
the maximum sentence for all other non-homicide first degree felonies is
only twenty years. 185 The Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed
the amendments to sections 3121 and 3123 unanimously.186 Representa-
ANN. § 9795.4(b) (West Supp. 2006) (noting assessment takes place after convic-
tion but before sentencing).
179. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9798(b) (West Supp. 2006) (providing that
police must notify neighbors, "director of the county children and youth service
agency," various school officials, day care providers and colleges and universities).
The notification must contain:
(i) The name of the convicted sexually violent predator. (ii) The address
or addresses at which he resides. (iii) The offense for which he was con-
victed, sentenced by a court, adjudicated delinquent or court martialed.
(iv) A statement that he has been determined by court order to be a
sexually violent predator, which determination has or has not been termi-
nated as of a date certain. (v) A photograph of the sexually violent
predator, if available.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9798(a) (1) (West Supp. 2006) (requiring that notice be
in writing).
180. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9799.4 (West Supp. 2005) (requiring coun-
seling "for the period of registration required by section 9795.1(b)").
181. See Kimberly B. Wilkins, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notifica-
tion Laws: Will These Laws Survive?, 37 U. RicH. L. REv. 1245, 1260 (2003) ("The
legal status of a sex offender is altered because all sex offenders are subject to
burdensome registration and notification requirements from which other
criminals and citizens are exempt.").
182. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9791 (a) (2) (West Supp. 2006) (explaining
reasons for enacting law).
183. See H. Legis. J., 186th Sess. 2168-70 (Pa. 2002) (presenting amendments
that increased penalties for selected sex crimes).
184. See id. (presenting amendments and remarks by Rep. Marsico in support
of amendments).
185. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (West 1998) (providing maximum
prison sentences for felonies).
186. See H. Legis. J., 186th Sess. 2169 (statement of Rep. Marisco) (noting
Senate had failed to act thus far on amendment).
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five Marsico, who sponsored the amendment, stressed the abhorrent na-
ture of child molestation.' 8 7 He argued that the state needed to increase
the punishment to match the severity of the crime.'
88
Further, the Pennsylvania legislature recently amended the three
strikes law, adding aggravated indecent assault, incest and sexual assault to
the list of "crimes of violence."18 9 These are the only three crimes listed
that are not first degree felonies. 190 While the legislative history does not
187. See id. ("[R]ape is always a heinous crime, but it is never more horrific
than when the victim is a child.").
188. See id. (arguing judges are limited by current maximums).
189. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714 (West Supp. 2006) (setting
mandatory minimum sentences for defendants convicted of second or third "crime
of violence"); S.B. 380, 184th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2000) (expanding list of
crimes defined as "crimes of violence").
190. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714(g) (West Supp. 2006) (defining
"crime of violence" for purposes of three strikes provision). The statute defines
the following crimes as "crimes of violence" as:
murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault
as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a) (1) or (2) (relating to aggravated as-
sault), rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent
assault, incest, sexual assault, arson as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301 (a)
(relating to arson and related offenses); kidnapping; burglary of a struc-
ture adapted for overnight accommodation in which at the time of the
offense any person is present; robbery as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 3701 (a) (1)(i), (ii) or (iii) (relating to robbery), or robbery of a motor
vehicle, or criminal attempt, criminal conspiracy or criminal solicitation
to commit murder or any of the offenses listed above, or an equivalent
crime under the laws of this Commonwealth in effect at the time of the
commission of that offense or an equivalent crime in another
jurisdiction.
Id. (listing crimes of violence that trigger three strikes law); see also 18 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 2502(c) (West 1998) (classifying third degree murder as first degree
felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(c) (West 1998) (classifying voluntary man-
slaughter as first degree felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2702(b) (West Supp.
2006) (classifying aggravated assault as defined in § 2702 (a) (1) and (2) as first
degree felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (b) (West 2000) (classifying kidnap-
ping as first degree felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (a) (West Supp. 2006)
(classifying rape as first degree felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3123(a) (West
Supp. 2006) (classifying involuntary deviate sexual intercourse as first degree fel-
ony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (a) (1) (West 2000) (classifying arson endan-
gering persons as first degree felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (a) (2) (West
2000) (classifying arson endangering persons as second degree murder if fire kills
people); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502(c) (1) (West 2000) (classifying burglary of
structure adapted for overnight accommodation that at time of offense any person
is present as first degree felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 3701(b) (West 2000)
(classifying robbery as defined in § 3701 (a) (i), (ii), and (iii) as first degree felony);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3702(a) (West 2000) (classifying robbery of motor vehi-
cle as first degree felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (West 2000) (classify-
ing sexual assault as second degree felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3125 (c)
(West Supp. 2006) (classifying aggravated indecent assault as either first or second
degree felony, depending on circumstances); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4302
(West Supp. 2006) (classifying incest as second degree felony). While aggravated
indecent assault now may be a first degree felony, at the time it was added to the
three strikes law, it was classified as a second degree felony only. See S.B. 1402,
674
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/7
2007] CASENOTE
address this provision of the bill, it appears significant that the bill singles
out sex crimes that are second degree felonies, especially since some first
degree felonies were not included on the list.19
As recently as November 2006, the Pennsylvania legislature has con-
tinued to pass legislation aimed at sex offenders. 19 2 One of these laws,
Jessica's Law, increased the minimum sentence for rape, involuntary devi-
ate sexual intercourse or aggravated indecent assault of a child from five
to ten years. 193 Jessica's Law also requires a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of twenty-five years for an offender's second conviction for most sex-
ual offenses and a mandatory life sentence for a third such conviction. 19 4
Finally, Jessica's Law toughens the penalty for sex offenders who violate
Megan's Law and uniquely allows the use of global positioning system
technology to track offenders. 195 Another measure signed into law in No-
186th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2002) (changing grading of aggravated inde-
cent assault).
191. See Sen. Legis. J., 184th Sess. 1535 (Pa. 2000) (discussing Megan's Law
aspect of Act); Sen. Legis. J., 184th Sess. 1273 (Pa. 2000) (discussing registration
changes to Megan's Law and applicability of Megan's Law to out-of-state offenders
who move to Pennsylvania). The first degree felonies that were not included in
the three strikes law include intentionally or knowingly causing a catastrophe. See
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3302(a) (West Supp. 2006) ("A person who causes a
catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, release of
poison gas, radioactive material or other harmful or destructive force or substance
... commits a felony of the first degree if he does so intentionally or knowingly.").
192. See Gov. Rendell Signs Bills to Protect Children, Aid Victims of Sexual Assault,
Toughen Penalties for Sex Offenders, supra note 22 (presenting governor's press re-
lease after signing four new bills into law). For a discussion of two of the laws,
Jessica's Law and SB 1054, see infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text. The two
additional measures signed at the same time standardized rape kits and created a
system of interpreters for courts and administrative agencies. Id. (quoting Gover-
nor Rendell, who said of the rape kit provision: "Rape cases are some of the most
difficult cases to prosecute, but this new law will ensure that hospitals gather the
kind of evidence that will secure solid convictions.").
193. See S.B. 944, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006) (listing offenses to
which mandatory minimum applies); Gov. Rendell Signs Bills to Protect Children, Aid
Victims of Sexual Assault, Toughen Penalties for Sex Offenders, supra note 22 (noting
that at time of law's enactment, average sentence for rape of child was six years);
Alison Hawkes, Senators Get Tougher on Sex Offenders, BucKs COUNTY COURIER TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2006 (discussing earlier version of bill passed by Senate committee). Jes-
sica's Law was first passed in Florida after a registered sex offender killed 9-year-old
Jessica Lunsford. See id. ("The case showed the limitations of requiring sex offend-
ers to list their addresses in public databases under Megan's Law.").
194. See S.B. 944, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006); Gov. Rendell Signs
Bills to Protect Children, Aid Victims of Sexual Assault, Toughen Penalties for Sex Offenders,
supra note 22 (quoting Governor Rendell, who said: "It is past time that the
criminals who commit these despicable acts receive the severe punishment they
deserve.").
195. See S.B. 944, § 8, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006) ("The Penn-
sylvania Board of Probation and Parole and county probation authorities may im-
pose supervision conditions that include offender tracking through global
positioning system technology."); Gov. Rendell Signs Bills to Protect Children, Aid Vic-
tims of Sexual Assault, Toughen Penalties for Sex Offenders, supra note 22 (describing
provisions of four sex-offender bills Governor Rendell signed into law).
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vember 2006 increased the statute of limitations for bringing criminal
child molestation charges.1 96 This law also extended reporting require-
ments for those who care for children, recognizing that children often do
not report the molestation they suffer. 19 7 All these changes in the law
indicate that the Pennsylvania legislature recognizes the unique nature of
sex crimes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sex crimes have unique characteristics that differentiate them from
other crimes, including a lack of physical evidence, a lack of witnesses
other than the victim, delays in reporting, societal bias against believing
women and children who report sexual crimes and an overall focus on the
victim's credibility. 198 Furthermore, sex crimes are characterized by signif-
icant recidivism among offenders.19 9 The federal government concluded
that the unique nature of sex crimes requires special rules of evidence
regarding the admission of evidence of prior acts.2 0 0 Despite the federal
196. See S.B. 1054, § 7 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006) (stating prose-
cution may be brought for "any sexual offense committed against a minor who is
less than 18 years of age any time up to the later of the period of limitation pro-
vided by law after the minor has reached 18 years or the date the minor reaches 50
years of age"); Gov. Rendell Signs Bills to Protect Children, Aid Victims of Sexual Assault,
Toughen Penalties for Sex Offenders, supra note 22 (noting that prior to law, charges
could be brought until victim reached age thirty, and new law allowed charges to
be brought until victim reached age fifty).
197. See Gov. Rendell Signs Bills to Protect Children, Aid Victims of Sexual Assault,
Toughen Penalties for Sex Offenders, supra note 22 (noting law "requires that those
who care for children report suspected abuse, regardless of whether the child re-
ports the abuse [and] deletes a requirement in the current child abuse reporting
law that says that only child abuse committed by a parent, guardian or person
living in the same home as the child or the child's parent, must be reported");
David O'Reilly & Julie Shaw, New Law Expands Sex Abuse Sanctions: Gov. Rendell is
Expected to Sign the Measure, A Response to the Grand Jury Report on Abuse of Children by
Clergy, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 22, 2006, at Al (quoting District Attorney Lynne M.
Abraham, who stated: "No longer does the child need to be the one to report the
crime.").
Another provision of this law imposes criminal penalties on employers who
"place the child in the care of someone known to be dangerous to children." Gov.
Rendell Signs Bills to Protect Children, Aid Victims of Sexual Assault, Toughen Penalties for
Sex Offenders, supra note 22 (noting law also imposes penalties for "preventing or
interfering with the reporting of suspected child abuse"). Further, the law man-
dates criminal background checks for people who work with children and in-
creases the amount of information about sex offenders that must be placed on the
Megan's Law website. Id. (noting that additional information includes whether
victim was minor).
198. For a discussion of the unique characteristics of sex crimes, see supra
notes 38-62 and accompanying text (discussing characteristics that make sex
crimes difficult to prosecute).
199. For a discussion of high recidivism rates among sex offenders, see supra
notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing studies of recidivism among sex
offenders).
200. For a discussion of the justification for the applicability of special rules of
evidence in sex crimes cases, see supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discuss-
[Vol. 52: p. 641
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government's findings, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided not to
include Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 in the Pennsylvania Rules
of Evidence. 20 ' The Pennsylvania courts, however, have been inching to-
wards recognizing that evidence of other crimes is necessary in sex crimes
cases, where the credibility of the victim is often at issue and where there is
often a dearth of evidence beyond the victim's testimony.20 2 Further-
more, the Pennsylvania legislature has repeatedly recognized the danger
of recidivism among sex offenders.
203
The laws enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature are not enough to
protect the people of Pennsylvania from recidivist sex offenders. 20 4 While
Megan's Law is a start, it faces constitutional and practical problems.
20 5
Long sentences are helpful, but first prosecutors need help getting convic-
tions.20 6 Beyond the challenges that all prosecutors face when trying sex
crimes cases, Pennsylvania prosecutors face additional hurdles, such as
jury instructions that suggest that the jury take into consideration the vic-
tim's delay in reporting in assessing the victim's credibility.
20 7
ing rationale behind congressional enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence 413
and 414).
201. For an illustration of Pennsylvania's refusal to adopt Rules 413 and 414,
see supra note 141 and accompanying text (comparing Federal Rules of Evidence
to Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence).
202. For a discussion of the trend toward admitting other crimes evidence,
see supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (discussing recent sex crimes cases
where other crimes evidence has been admitted).
203. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania legislature's recognition of the
unique nature of sex crimes cases, see supra notes 175-97 and accompanying text
(discussing statutory provisions that recognize unique nature of sex crimes).
204. For a discussion of the present inadequacy of Pennsylvania laws, see infra
notes 204-10 and accompanying text (discussing challenges Pennsylvania sex
crimes prosecutors face).
205. See Todd, supra note 20, at 533-34 (explaining that many sex offenders
subject to Megan's Law provide false addresses or do not provide addresses at all
and that police departments are unable to locate sex offenders who do not regis-
ter). In 2004, Pennsylvania's then Auditor General, Robert P. Casey, reported that
"the Pennsylvania State Police repeatedly issued notices to communities that were
wrong, late, and ineffective." Id. at 534-35 (noting Auditor Casey performed an
audit to track compliance with Megan's Law). Further, Auditor Casey found that
"the State Police gave incorrect information to local police departments, schools,
and child care centers nearly half of the time, resulting in families not knowing
that a sexually violent predator was living nearby, sometimes for weeks and even
months." Id. at 535 (noting that Auditor Casey believed "deficiencies with the
community notification requirements of Megan's Law demand[ed] immediate
attention").
206. For a discussion of the relative difficulty of prosecuting sex crimes com-
pared to other crimes, see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
207. See PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCrIONS
4.13A (2005) (instructing that delay in reporting is not conclusive evidence that
sex crime did not occur or that victim consented, but does bear on reliability of
victim's testimony).
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Furthermore, Pennsylvania prosecutors may not introduce expert tes-
timony to explain why a child might delay reporting sexual abuse.
208
Moreover, child victims may be subject to taint hearings, where the de-
fense has an additional opportunity to challenge the victim's credibility.
20 9
Pennsylvania prosecutors need Federal Rules 413 and 414 as an additional
tool to convict sex offenders. 210 When courts exclude evidence of other
sexual crimes and an offender like Howard Nevison escapes punishment,
what will happen when the offender molests another child?2 11 If courts
continue to exclude evidence of other sex crimes, some sexual offenders




208. See Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 836-38 (Pa. 1992) (holding
that experts may not testify "about behavior patterns generally exhibited by abused
children" or about why children delay reporting sexual abuse and omit details of
crimes when they do report). Courts in the following states have allowed expert
testimony to explain behavior of sexually abused children in general: Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Jersey, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See Elizabeth Trainor,
Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome (CSAAS) in Criminal Case, 85 A.L.R. 5th 595 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006) (not-
ing common traits among sexually abused children are: "(1) secrecy; (2)
helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, conflicted, and
unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retraction").
209. See Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27, 39 (Pa. 2003) (holding
that taint hearings are appropriate when there is accusation that child was manipu-
lated and noting that NewJersey, Delaware, Michigan, Washington and Wyoming
accepted idea, while Alaska, Kentucky and Ohio rejected it). While the majority in
Delbridge stated that taint hearings are not about questioning the credibility of the
victim, two dissenting justices disagreed with this contention. See id. at 47 (Nigro,
J., dissenting) ("I disagree with the majority's conclusion that taint is a matter of
competency, rather than credibility."); id. at 49 (Eakin, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (disagreeing with contention "that 'taint' always goes to compe-
tency" and disagreeing with "use of expert witnesses on what is really a credibility
issue").
210. For a further discussion of problems prosecuting sex crimes in general,
see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the
problems caused by the focus on the victim's credibility, see supra notes 38-62 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the particular problems Penn-
sylvania prosecutors face, see supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
211. For a further discussion of recidivism rates among sex offenders, see
supra notes 63-68.
212. See Herbert, supra note 11 (quotingjudge who said exclusion of evidence
that Nevison molested other relatives was "a pivotal ruling in the case that made it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the D.A. to prosecute the felony"); see also
Larsen, supra note 13, at 208 (noting admission or exclusion of other crimes evi-
dence is important in prosecutor's decision as to whether to proceed).
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